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In this paper, I develop a dynamic stochastic model of joint return migration and saving
decisions that accounts for uncertainty in future employment and income and estimate this
model using a longitudinal dataset on legal immigrants in Germany. The model gives a
number of implications about the level, timing and selection of return migration as well as
asset accumulation of immigrants according to their country of origin We also calculate the
net lifetime contributions of immigrants to the pension and unemployment insurance systems
of the host country. The estimated model is used to determine the impact of a number of
counterfactual policy experiments on the return and savings behavior of immigrants as well
as on their net contribution to the social security system. These counterfactuals include
changes in the unemployment insurance program, payment of bonuses to selected groups to
encourage return home, and exchange rate premiums by the source countries. In addition, I
assess the impact of counterfactuals in the macroeconomic environment, like changes in wages
in Germany and in purchasing power parity between Germany and the source countries.
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Many European countries see immigration as a potential solution to the social security crisis
they face due to an aging native population, rising health costs and low fertility rates.1
Immigration slows down the aging of population by bringing in younger workers. Due to
their age composition, immigrants are more likely to be conributing to the social security
system rather than receiving beneﬁts. In addition, return of immigrants to their home
c o u n t i r e si ss i g n i ﬁcant. These immigrants pay into the social security system for many years
before returning home but receive no beneﬁts if they return before qualifying to pension
beneﬁts or little beneﬁts even after that if they do not reside in the host country for a long
time. Moreover, those who choose to stay in the host country for the rest of their lives will be
drawing pension beneﬁts for a shorter period of time because immigrants coming from less
developed countries generally have lower life expectancies. However, immigrants can become
a ﬁnancial burden on the host country if they come at or stay until older ages because in
that case they could draw from public health and social insurance systems more than they
contribute to them. Moreover, if they are more likely to be unemployed compared to the
natives, their withdrawal of unemployment beneﬁts will be higher than their contributions
to the unemployment insurance system. Whether immigrants become a burden also depends
in part on whether the returners are selective of the most or least economically successful
immigrants. One goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of immigrants on the host
country social security system by calculating their net lifetime contributions to the pension
and unemployment insurance systems.
Another important policy issue regarding immigrants in many host countries is their take-
up of welfare beneﬁts. Many host countries are taking steps in the direction of restricting
beneﬁts to immigrants.2 In Germany, one reason for higher welfare participation among
immigrants is their higher unemployment rate compared to that of the natives. In December
1999, the unemployment rate was 23.3% for Turkish and 18.4% for Italian immigrants in
Germany. Therefore, a question of interest to policy makers is whether immigrants would be
less likely to stay if the unemployment insurance system were less generous. For this purpose,
1Boerch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) report the following for the German social security system: ”In 1993,
social security beneﬁts amounted to 10.3 percent of GDP, a share more than two and a half times larger
than in the United States.”
2For instance, in the U.S., a law passed in 1996 denied immigrants most types of welfare beneﬁts. In
Germany, immigrants without permanent residence may lose their right to stay if they live on welfare beneﬁts.
1I analyze how changes in the unemployment compensation system aﬀect immigrants’ return
decisions.
In order to inﬂuence the number, demographic composition and labor market status of
immigrants, some host countries adopted policies to motivate immigrants to return to their
home country. For instance, in 1983 Germany implemented a policy that provided ﬁnancial
aid to immigrants conditional on returning, especially oriented towards certain nationalities
and the unemployed.3 In this paper, I also analyze the impact of various ﬁnancial aid schemes
on return migration ﬂows and on the demographic composition and labor market outcomes
of the stayers as well as on immigrants’ net lifetime contribution to the social security system.
The return behavior of immigrants has important economic implications for the source
country as well. A major motivation for immigration is asset accumulation. Although an
exodus of workers seeking to take advantage of higher wages in other countries may impose
a cost on the source country economy, migrants who return home often bring with them
signiﬁcant amounts of assets. Moreover, many of them invest their assets in small businesses.4
I calculate the amount of wealth that enters the source country with the returning migrants
and evaluate the impact of source country policies aimed to increase this amount.
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of joint return migration and savings
decisions under uncertainty. In the model, migrants are subject to earnings, employment
and preference shocks and they make decisions about what fraction of their income to save
and about whether and when to return to their home country. The structural framework of
the model allows us to evaluate the impact a number of counterfactual policy experiments.
In addition, since I model the migrants’ decisions in a dynamic setting, I am able to explore
the eﬀects of these policies not only on migrants’ return decision but also on their duration
of residence. The model also incorporates unobserved heterogeneity in migrants’ permanent
skill endowments and preferences.
In the model, the reasons that immigrants return to their home country are higher pur-
chasing power of accumulated assets in the home country due to lower prices there and
immigrants preference to live in their home country rather than in Germany. I exploit the
v a r i a t i o ni nt h ep r i c el e v e l sa c r o s ss o u r c ec o u n t r i e st oi d e n t i f yt h ee ﬀects of purchasing power
on immigrants’ decisions. I also investigate how counterfactual changes in the purchasing
3Dustmann (1996) reports that the return aid amounted to 10,500 DM for each worker. In addition, there
was a 1,500 DM bonus for each child. (Roughly, 2 DM is equal to 1 US $.)
4Dustmann and Kirschkampf (2002) report that, based on a sample of Turkish return migrants, 51 percent
operated small businesses.
2power parity inﬂuence immigrants’ savings and return decisions. The model also incorpo-
rates variation in the earnings potential across the source countries. This would be especially
important in the return decision of younger immigrants. I assess the response of immigrants
to changes in the wage diﬀerential between the source country and Germany.
The model is estimated using a unique longitudinal dataset from Germany that contains
information on legal immigrants from ﬁve diﬀerent countries, which include EU member as
well as non-member countries. The pieces of information employed from the dataset include
immigrants’ labor market status and earnings as well as their return migration and saving
choices. In the estimation of the model, a simulated maximum likelihood technique is used.
The results indicate that the model can account very well for the key features in these four
pieces of information according to EU status.
The model provides a characterization of immigrants’ return and saving behavior by
country of origin. 61 percent of Turkish, 31 percent of ex-Yugoslavian, 88 percent of Greek, 83
percent of Italian and 92 percent of Spanish immigrants return to their home countries during
their lifetime. The hazard function of non-EU immigrants is hump-shaped and peaks around
15 years of residence whereas EU immigrants’ hazard function is initially a fast-decreasing
o n et h a tl e v e l so ﬀ after 10 years of residence before rising slightly again at retirement. The
savings proﬁles of both immigrant groups are downward-sloping. It is steeper for non-EU
immigrants, though. Both EU and non-EU immigrants save one third of their income right
after arrival. The saving rate gradually drops to 10 percent in the next 20 years. It keeps
dropping for non-EU immigrants and the savings rate averages around zero after 30 years of
residence whereas for EU immigrants it stays at around 10 percent from 20 to 30 years of
residence, then gradually drops to around 5 percent.
This paper provides the ﬁrst estimate, to my knowledge, of the amount of wealth that
return migrants bring to their home country. I ﬁnd that Turkish return migrants take on
average 92,857 DM, ex-Yugoslavians 91,407 DM, Greeks 94,093 DM, Italians 42,619 DM
and Spanish 84,129 DM to their home countries. Using information on the total number of
Turkish return migrants between 1993 and 1998, I estimate that the total amount of returned
wealth to Turkey was almost a billion DM per year in this time interval.
Using the estimates, I calculate the net contribution of immigrants to the pension and
unemployment insurance systems by country of origin and age at entry. Immigrants from all
ﬁve countries of origin, in particular those coming from non-EU countries, make positive net
lifetime contributions to the pension insurance system. This ranges from 5,662 DM for Greek
3immigrants to 21,461 DM for Turkish immigrants. On the other hand, net contribution to
the unemployment insurance system is negative for non-EU immigrants. It stays positive for
EU immigrants, though. When I examine the total net contributions to these two systems,
I ﬁnd that all four nationalities but ex-Yugoslavians make positive net contributions. For
ex-Yugoslavians, the net contribution is -1,095 DM. The positive net contributions ranges
from 5,844 DM for Turkish immigrants to 11,712 DM for Spanish immigrants.
An important contribution of this paper to the literature on immigrants’ impact on the
host country social security system is that it analyzes net contributions of immigrants when
return migration is a choice. In fact, I show that treating return migration as an exogenous
factor causes a serious underestimation of net lifetime contributions.
In a policy experiment, I show that the German government can in fact increase the
net contributions to these two insurance systems by providing ﬁnancial bonuses to the un-
employed conditional on return. This policy is more eﬀective on non-EU immigrants. For
non-EU immigrants, I ﬁnd that the optimal amount of bonus is in the 45,000 to 50,000DM
range regardless of the duration of residence at which the bonus is received when the bonus
is given at one point in time. The impact of the policy in decreasing unemployment rate
of immigrants is signiﬁcant at the time the policy is implemented. However, the fall in the
unemployment rate diminishes over time. When such a policy is kept in eﬀe c ta l lt h et i m e
rather than at a single point in time, net contributions to the two insurance systems can
still be increased. In this case, upper limits on age or duration of residence for qualiﬁcation
would be needed in order to prevent the immigrants from ﬁrst receiving the unemployment
beneﬁts then taking the bonus before retirement and leaving.
I also examine the impact of a policy that restricts the generosity of the unemployment
insurance system, which is the elimination of unemployment assistance —the second phase of
the beneﬁts—. Given the high unemployment rates of immigrants in Germany, a less generous
unemployment insurance system.could increase the return rates of immigrants. However, I
ﬁnd that this policy has a very small impact in terms of increasing the return rates of
immigrants.
In another policy experiment, I assess the impact of an exchange rate premium provided
by the source country governments on the amount of assets that immigrants take with them
when they return to their home country. Such policies have been used by various source
countries in order to boost the amount of returned wealth. Even though this policy increases
the fraction of returners, it also decreases the amount of average asset holdings of a returner
4because the average duration of residence of returners shortens. Moroever, the latter aﬀect
dominates the former and the amount of returned wealth from all emigrants from the source
country decreases.
The way immigrants’ return and savings choices respond to counterfactual changes in the
macroeconomic environment is also analyzed. The variables of the macroeconomic environ-
ment inﬂuencing immigrants’ return and saving decisions are wages in Germany, expected
wages in the home country and purchasing power parity between the home country and
Germany. Whenever the theoretical impact of a change in these variables is ambiguous,
the counterfactual simulations allows us to ﬁnd out the empirical answer. For instance, an
increase in German wages has conﬂicting income and substitution eﬀects on the return de-
cision. I ﬁnd that substitution eﬀect dominates and immigrants become more likely to stay.
On the saving decision, an increase in ppp has conﬂicting income and substitution eﬀects.
In this case, I ﬁn dt h a tt h ei n c o m ee ﬀect dominates and immigrants save less.
Next section provides background information, reviews the relevant literature and high-
lights the main contributions of this paper. In section 3, the model and its solution is
described. Section 4 presents the data and some descriptive analysis. Section 5 covers the
estimation method and section 6 presents the estimation results. The implications of the
results as to the host country social security system and the return of wealth to the home
country along with the returning migrants is examined in section 7. The results of policy
experiments and the counterfactuals on the macroeconomic environment are presented in
sections 8 and 9, respectively. Section 10 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LITERATURE
This study analyzes the behavior of the guestworkers of 1960’s and 70’s who immigrated to
Germany under the bilateral agreements signed by the German government with 5 Mediter-
ranean countries. (3 European Union countries: Greece, Italy and Spain; and 2 non-EU
countries: Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia). The German government actively recruited immi-
grant workers by opening recruitment posts in the capitals and major cities of these coun-
tries. Residents of these countries who were willing to go to Germany registered at these
agencies and were matched with employers in Germany. The initial goal of the guestworker
recruitment system was to have these migrants work in Germany for a limited number of
years and replace them with new ones once their permit expired. While most of the migrants
5in fact went back, some stayed. Paine (1974) reports that, in practice, if these guestworkers
maintained their employment status in Germany for a few years, they were able to stay.
In 1973, after the oil price shocks, recruitment of new immigrant workers came to a halt.
However, immigration continued mostly in the form of family reuniﬁcation.5
Immigrants constitute a relatively signiﬁcant part of the German work force. The Federal
Ministry of the Interior reports that “1.95m foreigners had a job that made them liable to
pay social security contributions in the western federal territory, meaning they account for
8.9 per cent of all gainfully employed persons.” Return migration of these immigrants has
remained at a signiﬁcant level. Between 1993 and 1998, around 45,000 Turks returned to
Turkey each year on average (Federal Ministry of the Interior). Given that there are around
2 million Turkish immigrants in Germany, this roughly amounts to a 2% annual hazard rate.
The literature has identiﬁed a number of determinants of return migration. Borjas and
Bratsberg (1996) emphasize that return migration may be part of an optimal life-cycle loca-
tion decision. At the time they immigrate, migrants realize that after they acquire physical
or human capital in the host country, it may be optimal for them to return because the
returns to that type of capital are higher in the home country. The assets that guestworkers
accumulate in Germany have higher purchasing power at the home country due to the lower
prices there. On the other hand, since most guestworkers took jobs as unskilled workers, it is
quite unlikely that their goal in moving to Germany was to acquire human capital. Even if
they acquired some skills, these skills would be speciﬁct ot h eG e r m a nl a b o rm a r k e t ,w h i c h
is a more capital-intensive production environment, and would not ﬁt to the needs of the
home country labor market. In fact, based on a survey of Turkish emigrants from Germany
in Turkey, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) report that only 6 percent worked as salaried
workers after return whereas 51 percent of the returners were self-employed. The other 43
percent were retired. Another interesting fact that Dustmann and Kirchkamp report is that
the median age of the retirees among the returners was 45. This suggests that some im-
migrants were able to accumulate enough assets by a relatively early age to spend the rest
of their lives as rentiers. The facts that half of these migrants engaged in entrepreneurial
activities after return and that most of the rest lived as rentiers suggest a savings motive
for immigrating to Germany. If the goal of guestworkers were to accumulate assets, they
would have high saving rates. Based on a empirical investigation of Turkish households in
Germany, Kumcu (1989), in fact, ﬁnds evidence for very high savings rates. Another reason
5Only 10% of the migrants in our sample entered Germany after 1973.
6for return migration, noted by Hill (1987), is that migrants have a preference for location.
Return migration may also be the result of unexpected events, either in the host country or
in the home country (Berninghaus and Siefer-Vogt, 1992). Unexpected changes in earnings
or in preferences for living in Germany, for instance due to the death of family members
back at home, might alter immigrants’ decisions.
There is very limited empirical evidence concerning the relationship between savings and
return migration. The existing empirical papers on the savings behavior of immigrants,
Merkle and Zimmermann (1992), Kumcu (1989), treat return migration as exogenous. How-
ever, Dustmann (1995) shows that treating return decision as exogenous in analyzing the
savings behavior of migrants could give false implications in policy experiments. The re-
search on the joint return and savings decisions of immigrants has been theoretical so far.
Berninghaus and Seifert-Vogt (1992) provide a theoretical analysis of optimal savings and
return migration strategies in a stochastic dynamic model where the cause of return is higher
purchasing power parity. In a similar but more extended model, I conduct the ﬁrst empirical
analysis of this joint saving and return migration decisions.
There has been a number of studies involving the impact of immigrants on the host
country social security system. Analyzing the redistribution caused by public transfers, old-
age pensions, and tax and social security contributions in the German context, Buchel and
Frick (2001) ﬁnd that immigrants are net payers. They attribute this fact mainly to the age
composition of immigrants, which makes them less likely to receive old-age pensions. This
study examines net contributions in a few years and therefore is likely to be inﬂuenced with
the particular age composition or labor market situation in that few years. On the other
hand, this study conducts a longitudinal analysis; therefore, it accounts for the changes in
immigrants’ contributions over their life cycle. Lee and Miller (2000), using detailed demo-
graphic and ﬁscal environment projections, calculate the net ﬁscal impact of immigration
over the life-cycle and generations in the U.S and ﬁnd that the impact of changing the level
of immigration would be rather small. However, using similar aggregate demographic and
employment projections to calculate the contribution rate to the social security system un-
der various migration scenarios that would keep the budget of the pension system balanced,
Borsch-Supan (1994) ﬁnds that immigration reduces the increase in the contribution rates
by 50 percent and that the positive impact of immigration through the alleviation of depen-
dency ratio dominates the negative impact of immigration through its depressing eﬀect on
the wages. In a calibrated overlapping generations general equilibrium model, Storesletten
7(2000) ﬁnds the annual immigration necessary to balance the government budget as well as
the net present value of admitting an immigrant. Unlike Lee and Miller, he ﬁnds that the
quantitative impact of immigration on the ﬁscal policy can be signiﬁcant and under certain
immigration policies it would be possible to sustain current ﬁscal policy.
Unlike the above mentioned studies whose ﬁndings are based on calibrated values, my
results come from a maximum likelihood estimation in which I use a rich longitudinal dataset
and to my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst estimated structural model of migration behavior and
its impact on the host as well as source countries. In order to estimate my model, I had to
keep it simpler, though. For instance, I ignore the indirect eﬀects on wages and on native
productivity. However, empirical studies conducted so far on this issue found that there is no
evidence for immigrants depressing the labor market conditions for natives. Friedberg and
Hunt (1995) in their survey of the impact of immigration on the host country and Lalonde
and Topel (1991) point out that the eﬀect of immigration on equilibrium wages is negligible.
Moreover, given the rigid institutional features of the German labor market, this becomes
even more likely. On the other hand, one might expect the impact on the employment
of natives to be more important. However, Piscke and Velling (1997) ﬁnd no employment
displacement eﬀects of immigration on natives in Germany. Therefore, I think that a partial
equilibrium approach for this study is appropriate.
I also limit the analysis to ﬁrst-generation immigrants only. An intergenerational exten-
sion of this study would require modeling fertility choices of the ﬁrst-generation immigrants,
which would severely increase the computational burden. On the other hand, I also intro-
duce more general modeling features. All of above-mentioned studies on the ﬁscal impact of
immigration take return migration as exogenous. However, return migration is very much
linked to household income and labor market status and this has important implications for
the net ﬁscal impact of immigrants. For instance, ﬁscal impact will be more positive when
immigrants who are less successful in the labor market are more likely to return compared
to that under a random outﬂow of immigrants. Moreover, it will also be important whether
immigrants are more likely to return in the early periods or in later periods in calculating
their net contributions. By explicitly modeling the return migration choice, I am able to
account for the eﬀect of the timing as well as selection in return migration on the net con-
tributions of immigrants. I also add a new dimension to the studies on the ﬁscal impact
of immigration.by examining policies from the return perspective. I analyze the results of
a number of policies aimed at altering the selection process in return migration in order to
8increase the net contributions of immigrants to the pension and unemployment insurance
systems.
3T H E M O D E L
In this section I present the basic structure of the model and its solution in the dynamic
setting.
3.1 Basic Structure
The basic structure is the discrete choice dynamic programming approach, as outlined in
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989). Immigrants choose among a ﬁnite set of mutually exclusive
alternatives over a ﬁnite horizon. I model the decisions of male household heads.
3.1.1 Choice Set
The elements of the choice set are return migration and savings decisions. Each period,
immigrants realize their labor market status and earnings and decide ﬁrst whether to stay in
Germany or go back to their home country. If they choose to stay, they also make a decision
about how much to save.
3.1.2 Preferences in Germany
Immigrants have preferences over consumption (ct) and location of residence. Their marginal
utility of consumption (µ) varies by their labor market status (lt), age and their permanent
unobserved preference characteristics.6 Below, ρ(.) stands for immigrants’ psychic cost of
living in Germany. This is the diﬀerence between the psychic utility in Germany and that in
the host country. Immigrants’ pyschic cost varies by their duration of residence in Germany,










6Individuals are allowed to diﬀer in their permanent unobserved characteristics as well as in their observed
characteristics. We group the immigrants into a ﬁnite number of types according to these unobserved
characteristics and assume that immigrants within a type group share the same unobserved heterogeneity.
9Above, λ is the constant relative risk aversion parameter and ηs
t is a random shock to
preferences.
Constraints Given their net earnings (yt) and asset income (rAt), immigrants make their
consumption and saving decisions. At is asset holdings at period t and cmin is the minimum
consumption level, which is equal to the subsistence income set by the German government.
In this model, minimum consumption level is an institutional feature because this consump-
tion level is guranteed by the German government through its social assistance for subsistence
income program. I allow this subsistence income, which depends on family size, to vary by
age and nationality (z). (This is explained later in the social assistance subsection.) In
addition, borrowing is not allowed.7
ct +( At+1 − At) ≤ yt + rAt
ct ≥ cmin(aget,z)
At ≥ 0
3.1.3 Labor Market Status in Germany
I assume that all male household heads who are not retired are willing to work. Therefore,
whether they are unemployed or employed depends only on whether or not they receive job
oﬀers.
There are three potential paths to retirement: 1) One can retire after age 65. 2) Retire-
ment is also possible at age 63 conditional on having a long service life, which is 35 years. 3)
Conditional on a qualifying period of at least 15 years, workers who have been unemployed
for 52 weeks can retire at age 60.8
If an immigrant does not qualify for retirement according to the above rules, random job
oﬀers determine whether they are employed (l =1 )or unemployed (l =0 ) .T h e j o b o ﬀer
probability, (lt) varies according to the labor market status in the previous period, age, age
at entry to Germany, nationality as well as permanent labor market characteristics.
lt = L(lt−1,age t,age 0,z,type)
7Immigrants are there to save.
8We assume that this structure is unchanged during the life-cycle of an immigrant (In fact, there were a
slight upward adjustment in the retirement age.) and that immigrants expect no change.
10Once one of the above three retirement rules becomes applicaple, immigrants may enter
retirement (l =2 ) , which is an absorbing state. Employment status in this case is modeled
using a multinomial logit.
3.1.4 Income in Germany
Gross Earnings L a b o rm a r k e te a r n i n g so fa ni m m i g r a n ta tp e r i o dt ,yt, depends on how
much human capital he has acquired and on the rental price of human capital, p.T h e
level of human capital at any period, Ht, depends on the years of residence, age at entry,








Social Security Contributions Workers in Germany pay three types of social security
contributions: pension insurance, unemployment and health insurance premiums. Pension
insurance contribution is applied at a rate of 9.35% (τp) and unemployment insurance con-
tribution is applied at a rate of 2.15% (τu), both up to a earnings maximum of 85,000DM
(ymax) (1998 prices). The health insurance contribution is applied at a rate of 7% (τh) up
to a earnings maximum of 0.75ymax (in 1998 prices). Earnings below 6,000DM (ymin)(1998
prices) are exempt from social security taxes.910
Γ(yt)=
0 if yt ≤ ymin
(τp + τu + τh)yt if ymin < yt ≤ 0.75ymax
(τp + τu)yt + τhymax,1 if 0.75ymax < yt ≤ ymax
(τp + τu)ymax,2 + τhymax,1 if ymax,2 < yt
(1)
Net Earnings Net earnings, yt is gross earnings net of social security contributions and
income taxes.
yt =( 1− τ [yt − Γ(yt)])[yt − Γ(yt)]
9When earnings is below the tax-exempt level, employer still makes a insurance contribution and this
period counts toward pension qualifying period for the worker.
10There has been very small changes in the social security contribution rates. We assume that immigrants
expect the contributions rates to stay at this level when they make forecasts about the future in the forward-
looking nature of the model.
11Above, τ [yt − Γ(yt)] is the average income tax rate for yt − Γ(yt), earnings net of social
security contributions.τ (.) is calculated according to following marginal tax rate schedule:
Income below subsistence income is tax free. Above that level, the marginal tax rate rises
from 22% to 56% up to an earnings level of 120,000DM (in 1998 prices)11
Unemployment Beneﬁts and Unemployment Assistance Immigrants who worked
for at least 360 days in the last 3 years can receive unemployment beneﬁts, which are equal
to 67% of their last net earnings if they have at least one child. The entitlement duration
varies from 180 to 960 days depending on the age and experience of the worker. However,
there is a second phase of the unemployment insurance system. Workers who are no longer
eligible for unemployment beneﬁts can receive unemployment assistance. This is equal to
57% of their last net earnings if they have at least one child and there is no limit to the
duration of unemployment assistance after the exhaustion of unemployment beneﬁts.
For tractability, I take unemployment beneﬁts and assistance at any period as the above
percentages of expected net earnings at that period rather than as percentages of the real-
ized last net earnings.12 In addition, I take the duration of entitlement to unemployment
beneﬁts equal to two years (which is equivalent to one period in the solution of the model).
Therefore, an immigrant who is unemployed for two consecutive periods receives unemploy-
ment assistance instead, which is ten percent less. Moreover, unlike unemployment beneﬁts,
unemployment assistance is means tested according to asset income. Both unemployment
beneﬁts and assistance are net earnings and, therefore neither social security nor income
taxes are applicable.
11These numbers are chosen to average the values for the years 1965 to 2000. Even though there has
been changes in these values, they were small in magnitude.We assume that immigrants do not expect any
changes in the marginal tax rate schedule in the future when solving the forward-looking model.
12There is an additional approximation here in that taxes are calculated based on expected earnings.
Expected value of taxes could be diﬀerent from taxes calculated based on expected earnings due to the kinks
in the tax function.
12yt =

            
            



























if (lt =0and lt−1 =0and qualiﬁed for beneﬁts)

            
            
Immigrants who have never been employed since their entry to Germany do not qualify
for unemployment beneﬁts. I assume that after 4 years of residence, all immigrants qualify
for unemployment beneﬁts. In other words, residence in the host country without work
experience can not last more than 4 years.13
Pension Beneﬁts German pension insurance system is mandatory to all workers except
for the self-employed and those with very low incomes. For these two groups, which is a
small fraction of the immigrant population, I assume that they choose to enroll in the pension
insurance system.
The minimum contribution period to qualify for pension beneﬁts is ﬁve years in Germany.
Since periods of unemployment are included in the qualifying period in the German pension
insurance system and in the model all immigrants are willing to work, everybody with a
duration of residence longer than the qualifying period is entitled to pension beneﬁts.
Pension beneﬁts in Germany depend on workers’ history of labor market earnings and
on their duration of contribution. The replacement rate, deﬁned as pension beneﬁts over
average net earnings of all employed workers, for a worker with forty-ﬁve year earnings history
and average lifetime earnings is 72 percent. In addition, pension beneﬁts are proportional
to duration of contribution. Therefore, for the worker with average lifetime earnings, each
additional year of earnings history amounts to a 1.6 percent increase in the replacement rate.
For tractability, I generalize this property for the worker with average lifetime earnings
to all workers. This assumes that the replacement rate does not depend on the relative
income level of workers, i.e. there is no redistribution. Borsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999)
13It would be impossible to maintain residence status after 4 years of unemployment for non-EU immi-
grants. Moreover, many of the guestworkers were already assigned to German employers at the time of entry.
Besides, further residence after 4 years of unemployment would be very unlikely for any economic migrant
with zero earnings.
13report that there is in fact very little redistribution in the German pension insurance system,
e x c e p tf o rt h o s ew i t hv e r yh i g hi n c o m e s— t h o s ew h o s ei n c o m ea r et h r e et i m e sa sm u c ha st h e
national average—. Given the relatively low incomes of immigrants in Germany, there is a
very tiny of fraction of them in this income range.
Again for tractability, in calculating pension beneﬁts at period t, I assume that replace-
ment rate is applied to the average of expected net earnings at all periods until period t rather
than to the average of realized net earnings. Below, e yt is this baseline earnings position to
















Pension beneﬁciaries do not pay contributions to the pension or unemployment insurance
systems. Only health insurance contributions, ΓH, according to the rules in equation 1 above,
are applied. Pension beneﬁciaries do not pay income taxes either. Thus, pension beneﬁts
can be written as follows:
yt =0 .016te yt − Γ
H(e yt) if lt =2 and t ≥ 5 years
Social Assistance for Subsistence Income Immigrants can also receive social assistance
if their income is not high enough to provide for their basic needs. Eligibility depends on net
income and asset holdings. If the sum of monthly net income and asset ﬂows of residents falls
below the subsistence income level14, the government makes up for the diﬀerence. Subsistence
income for a family depends on its size and varies across states. In 1998, the payment for the
head of the household averaged around 520 DM across states. The spouse of the household
head receives 80% of this amount and there is an additional payment for each child, that
varies from 50% to 90% depending on the age of the child.
Marriage status and the number of children are not included in the model as state vari-
ables. However, marriage status and number of children is strongly correlated with age
and nationality. Therefore, I write the subsistence level income as 520DM times a family
multiplier that varies by age and nationality. The dependence of the multiplier on age and
nationality is estimated outside of the model. Details of the calculation of this multiplier is
14According to the German Ministry for Health and Social Services, this subsistence income includes
expenses on food, housing, clothing, toiletries, household goods, heating and everday personal necessities,
and -within resonable limits- expenses for socializing.
14provided in Appendix C.
yt + rAt >=5 2 0∗ family_multp(aget,z) DM per month
3.1.5 Preferences in the Home Country
Once an immigrant returns to his home country, he exits the panel. As a result, I have no
information on his labor market status, earnings or savings decisions after return. Therefore,
the utility an immigrant receives from returning to his home country to spend the rest of
his life there, V L( e St), is written as a function of a subset of the state variables at the time
of return. These state variables include assets interacted with purchasing power parity, age,




This function is explained in detail in Appendix A along with the other functional spec-
iﬁcations.
3.2 The Problem in Recursive Formulation
Given the current realizations of the shocks to their earnings and preferences, immigrants
calculate the value of staying in Germany, V S
t (St), and the value of returning to the home
country, V L
t ( e St), and make their return decision accordingly. St is the state space at time
t. The decision spell starts when an immigrant enters Germany and goes until he dies or
returns to his home country. Mortality is deterministic and the age of mortality is taken
as 70 for Turkish immigrants, 72 for Yugoslavian and 76 for Italian, Greek and Spanish
immigrants in accordance with life expectancies for males in these countries.




t ( e St)}
If immigrants choose to stay in Germany, they make a saving decision over K alternatives
to maximize the present discounted value of their remaining lifetime utility.15 Below dk
τ =1
if alternative k is chosen at period τ and =0 otherwise. δ is the discount factor. The
expectation is taken over the distribution of shocks to earnings and preferences.
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S
















15The saving choice is discretized into 10 separate values, which are ±(10,000, 20,000, 30,000) and 0,
+40,000, +50,000 and +60,000.
15The above problem can be recast in the following dynamic programming form.
V
S
t (St)=m a x
At+1
{u(At+1,ηt)+δEtVt+1(St+1)}
The solution to this problem is given by a decision rule that takes the points of the
state space to the optimal saving choice. In the last period of the problem, the continuation
value is a bequest function that depends on the level of assets and the permanent preference
characteristics.
VT+1(ST+1)=B(AT+1,type)
The solution of the problem is not analytic and a numerical backward solution algorithm
is used. One peculiar thing about this problem is that its solution involves the calculation
of EtVt+1(St+1), which requires calculation of multi-dimensional integrals due to the number
of stochastic elements in the model. This is calculated using Monte-Carlo integration over
the joint distribution of shocks to preferences and earnings at all possible points of the state
space for all periods. Since the number of the state space points at which the problem needs
to be solved depends on the decision horizon, I take the decision period as two years to
alleviate the computational burden.
4D A T A
The dataset used in this study is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). This is
a longitudinal dataset of households in Germany that contains an oversampled group of
immigrants from ﬁve Mediterranean countries, of which three are members of the European
Union (Greece, Italy and Spain) and two are not (Turkey and Ex-Yugoslavia). I use the 2000
version of the GSOEP, which is conducted annually from 1984 to 2000. The initial sample
contains 1326 households.
I analyze the behavior of male immigrants who made the choice to immigrate to Germany.
Therefore, I restrict the sample to households with a ﬁrst-generation immigrant male. A
ﬁrst-generation immigrant is deﬁned as one who entered Germany after the age of 18. 1055
households have a ﬁrst-generation male household head. In addition, 9 households have a
ﬁrst-generation male whose family status is registered as a spouse. Deﬁning these 9 males as
household heads, I end up with 1064 households with a ﬁrst-generation male household head.
Two of these are dropped because these male household heads entered Germany after the age
16of 50. Consequently, the ﬁnal sample contains 1062 male ﬁrst-generation household heads.16
The surveys on these household heads contain detailed information on return migration,
savings, labor market status and earnings.
Return migration is reported as "moved out of country" in the sample by information
gathered from other family members, relatives, neighbours, and so forth. Of course, it is
possible that some of these immigrants were elsewhere in Germany but mistakenly reported
as "moved out of the country". The model incorporates this possibility by allowing for
classiﬁcation error in return migration outcomes.
Savings information is available only after 1991. Immigrants are asked about their
monthly savings. However, they are not asked about their dissavings; therefore, the data is
censored at zero. Since the saving choice can take negative values in the model, I treat the
zero saving values in the data as zero or negative in the estimation.
Information on immigrants’ labor market status is available from their year of entry to
Germany. The part from their year of entry to 1983 is available in a yearly form, gathered
from retrospective questions. The data on labor market status after 1983 is available in a
monthly form I also have information on income annually from 1983 on, including amounts
for each type of income. In accordance with the sources of income in the model, I use labor
income, unemployment beneﬁts and assistance, pension beneﬁts, subsistence income and
asset ﬂows components. All the income data in the paper are reported in 1998 prices.
The initial sample of immigrants is a random sample of the immigrants in Germany in
1984. Since some immigrants already returned to their home country by 1984, this is not
a random sample of the initial cohorts of immigrants. Therefore, the information on their
return behavior, for instance, within the ﬁrst ten years only comes from the immigrants who
entered Germany after 1975. (The ﬁrst return observed is in 1985.) This implies that when
I compute the Kaplan-Meier hazard functions for return, I assume that there are no cohort
eﬀects.
Another issue in the data with regard to the model is that there is no information about
asset holdings, which is a state variable of the model. To deal with this problem, I use a
particular estimation method that solves the problem of missing state variables in dynamic
16In addition, there are 28 other ﬁrst-generation males who enter the sample later, after 1984, mostly
through marriages to the initial members of the sample. However, since this group is a selected sample
of immigrants who entered Germany after 1984 through their higher propensity to marry, we exclude this
group.
17panel data models.
Macro data are also used in the estimation. These are the purchasing power parity of
the source countries with Germany, which determine the purchasing power of accumulated
wealth in Germany, and the ratios of expected wages in the source countries, which is used
as a measure of the relative attractiveness of the labor markets in the source countries. In
calculating the expected wages, unemployment rates and replacement rates of unemployment
beneﬁts in the source countries are taken into consideration. Since there is no calendar year
in the model, averages of time series data are taken.17 T h em a c r od a t aa r ed i s p l a y e di nT a b l e
4.1.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 4.1.1 illustrates the employment probability and mean income according to duration
of residence by EU status. For both EU and non-EU immigrants, employment probability
drops signiﬁcantly by duration of residence. Analyzing this by age-at-entry cohorts reveals
that this is caused by the aging of immigrants rather than duration of residence per se. The
downward proﬁle is much more prominent for non-EU immigrants. The income proﬁles in
Figure 4.1.1 indicate that per period income levels lie between sixty thousand and seventy-
ﬁve thousand DM. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in income levels according to EU status.
EU immigrants have only slightly higher income levels. In the few last periods, as immigrants
retire, income levels drop. The proﬁle is rather ﬂat for both EU and non-EU immigrants.
Despite increasing unemployment rates, income levels are not decreasing. Table 4.1.1 displays
the transition into retirement for all immigrants. The earliest age of retirement is sixty, at
which 37 percent of immigrants enters retirement. At age 66, ninety-two percent of the
immigrants are already retired. Retirement information is not disaggregated to EU status
level due to limited number of observations at these ages.
Mean non-negative savings proﬁle18 according to EU status is illustrated in Figure 4.1.2.19
17One could argue that not having calendar time, we could miss the impact of a time trend in the macroeco-
nomic conditions in the source countries. In particular, this is the case for Spain which saw an improvement
in labor market conditions after joining the EU. However, these changes would be much less important
for older generations and most of the Spanish guestworkers were beyond their prime-age when the positive
changes in Spanish labor market took place.
18This is mean non-negative savings because savings data are censored below at zero.
19Since the savings data is available only after 1991, the earliest savings observation we have is at the ﬁfth
period.
18T h em o s tp r o m i n e n tf e a t u r eo ft h eﬁgure is the diﬀerence in the shape of the proﬁles according
to EU status. There is a signiﬁcant decrease in the mean non-negative savings of non-EU
immigrants over duration of residence while that of EU immigrants seem to be relatively
constant over time. This is not caused by the diﬀerences in their income proﬁles; their
income proﬁles as can be seen in Figure 4.1.1 are very similar. Between the 5th and 10th
periods, non-EU immigrants save on average more than EU immigrants whereas after the
12th period, EU immigrants save more.
Figure 4.1.3 displays the smoothed Kaplan-Meier hazard contributions according to EU
status20. EU immigrants are more likely to return. A comparison of the survivor functions
by EU status reveals that they are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. There are important diﬀferences
in the timing of return as well. EU immigrants are much more likely to return in the earlier
periods. Their hazard rates drop precipitously in the ﬁrst ﬁve periods and after that their
hazard rates pretty much smooths out at a six percent level, with a slight rise as immigrants
reach retirement age. On the other hand, for non-EU immigrants the hazard function has a
hump-shape that peaks at around the 7th to 8th periods (15 years of residence) at a level of
ﬁve and a half percent.
5 ESTIMATION METHOD
The observed outcomes in the data are return migration choice (mt), savings choice (At+1 −
At), earnings of the migrant (yt), and the labor market status of the migrant (lt). Let {Oi} =
{Di,X i} denote observed outcomes for individual i, where Di = {dit} = {{mit},{Ait −
Ait−1}} is the history of observed choices and Xi = {xit} = {{lit},{yit}} is the history of ob-










where ti,19xx is the period number for individual i in 19xx and Ti i st h el a s tp e r i o di nt h e
sample for individual i. If the return choice is to leave, in the last period, Ti, the other
outcomes are not observed.
One of the endogenous state variables, assets, is not observed. Therefore, I use the
method introduced by Keane and Wolpin (2001) for estimating dynamic panel data models
with unobserved endogenous state variables. Typically, calculation of the probabilities that
form the likelihood function requires conditioning on past state variables. The novel feature
20This is based on a weighted kernel smooth of estimated hazard contributions. A relatively narrow
bandwidth is chosen in order not to smooth to much.
19of this method is that it obviates the need to calculate these conditional probabilities. The
underlying idea of this estimation method is to minimize the distance between the simulated
and reported outcomes. A measure of the distance between the simulated and reported
outcomes is constructed by assuming that the observed outcomes are measured with error.
In a recent paper, Keane and Sauer (2003) show that this estimator has good small sample
properties in a more extended setting.
The key assumption, therefore, is that the observed outcomes are measured with error.
By acknowledging the existence of measurement errors (classiﬁcation errors in the case of
discrete outcomes), I incorporate into the likelihood calculation, for instance, the fact that
when a migrant is observed as employed, there is a positive probability that he was in
fact unemployed, but his employment status was classiﬁed incorrectly in the data. In the
case of observed earnings and savings, I take a similar approach; however, in this case the
measurement errors have continuous distributions.
5.1 Generation of Simulated Outcomes
Using the initial state variables, {A0 =0 21,l 0 =1 22} and the sequence of random shocks













each individual i. Unbiased classiﬁcation errors are also constructed using these simulated








The contribution to the likelihood of individual i is calculated by the below simulator,
which is the probability of observing the reported outcomes conditional on the simulated
outcomes averaged over the N simulated choice histories. This simulator is conditional on
staying in Germany until 1984 because the sample contains only immigrants who stayed in
21Since most of these immigrants are unskilled young people from poor regions that chose to work in a
foreign country, we assume that their initial wealth is zero.
22Since employment transition is a ﬁrst-order Markov chain and that most immigrants were employed
in their ﬁrst period in Germany —being guestworkers, they were already assigned jobs before entry—, this























in ) is not conditional on any of the state variables.
Therefore, this probability can be calculated even when some of the state variables are not
observed.
Unobserved heterogeneity enters the estimation in the following way: Following Heckman
and Singer’s (1984) non-parametric modeling of unobserved heterogeneity, I assume that
there is a ﬁnite number (K) of type groups. Each individual i may belong to any of these
type groups, 1 to K. It is the probability of being a certain type that diﬀers across individuals.
Therefore, when I generate the simulated outcomes for individual i and calculate the above
simulator, I do it separately for all types. Then, the likelihood contribution for this individual
is calculated as the weighted average of the above simulator over the probabilities of his

























where κi,k, the probability of individual i being of type k, is speciﬁed as a logit with age
at entry and country of origin as arguments.
κk = κ(age0,z,t 1983)
The probability of observing the reported spells conditional on the simulated spells














Measurement error distributions and classiﬁcation error rates are used to calculate these
probabilities. See appendix B for these calculations. For the optimization method, the
Downhill Simplex Algorithm is used.
6R E S U L T S
In this section, maximum likelihood estimation results based on the full solution of the
dynamic model are presented.
216.1 Model Fit
I ﬁrst illustrate and discuss how the model’s predictions as to the return migration and
savings choices as well as the exegenous transitions ﬁt the observed features of the data.
Figure 6.1.1 compares the actual and predicted hazard functions for non-EU immigrants.
The model captures both the level and timing of return migration very well. In fact, the
predictions are almost identical to the actual values. Model predictions of the hazard rates
of EU immigrants are compared to the actual values in Figure 6.1.2 Again, the model
captures the level and timing of return migration very well. The ﬁti nt h eﬁrst ﬁve periods
and in the few last periods are not as good, though. This is expected because the number of
observations in these ranges is smaller. However, the model captures the ﬂat region around
6 percent hazard rate very well.
Figure 6.1.3 displays how the predicted savings from the model compare to the actual
savings according to immigrants’ EU status. For non-EU immigrants, the model captures the
downward-sloping proﬁle of savings. The level of savings ﬁt well, too. The only exceptions,
again, are the ﬁrst and last few periods where the observations are fewer. As can also be seen
from the ﬁgure, the model predicts the ﬂat proﬁle of the savings function of EU immigrants
around 9,000DM very well. The model also captures the decline toward the last few periods.
However, this decline is not as strong as it is seen in the data. Once more, this is due to
the fact that the strong decline in the data is brought about by a few observations who are
smoothed out by the higher frequency of observations in the middle ranges.23
The exogenous transitions whose outcomes are used in the estimation include employ-
ment, retirement, and earnings functions. Figures E.1 presents the ﬁto fe m p l o y m e n ts t a t u s
according to EU status. In both cases, the predictions match the data quite well. They cap-
ture the decreasing proﬁle of the employment probability as well as the diﬀerence between
the immigrants according to their EU status in their employment probability. Furthermore,
t h el e v e l sa r ev e r ys i m i l a r . T h eﬁt for retirement transition is shown in Table E.1 for all
23Note that we can not compare the saving predictions of our model in the ﬁrst 5 periods as there is no
savings information at these periods in the data. Our model predicts that both EU and non-EU immigrants
save more than a third of their income right after arrival. This high saving rate is consistent with the
ﬁndings of the literature as to immigrants’ savings in Germany. Paine (1974), based on a report by the State
Planning Organization of Turkey in 1971 —when all Turkish guestworkers would be in Germany for less then
5 periods—, reports a saving rate of 36 percent. Based on a study conducted by the Central Bank of Turkey
in 1986, which gathered saving and income information according to immigrants’ duration of residence, we
ﬁnd that the saving rate of Turkish immigrants with less than four years of residence was 39 percent.
22immigrants. I keep this at a more aggregated level because the number of observations gets
too small. Although the model overstates the percentage of retired immigrants, in particular
at ages 62 and 64, it provides a good approximation to the actual transition to retirement.
The prediction of the model for the income variable is presented in Figures E.2 separately
for EU and non-EU immigrants. In both cases, the model predicts the level and shape of the
proﬁl ew e l l .I tc a p t u r e st h ef a c tt h a tt h eh u m pi sw e a ka sw e l la st h ef a c tt h a ti ti sw e a k e r
for non-EU immigrants. As always, the ﬁt is worse in the beginning and ending periods
where the data are sparse.
I believe that the above evidence of the model ﬁt provide a good case for the credibility
of the model. Obviously, the credibility of the implications of the model and the results of
the counterfactual experiments hinges on the credibility of the model.
6.2 Parameter Estimates
The estimated parameters and their standard errors are presented in Appendix D. There are
124 parameters in the model. I am not interested in the estimated value of any parameters
per se; however, here I will examine the parameters of value of returning home function
—because this is the most ad hoc part of the model and I would like to check whether the
estimated values are reasonable— and the estimated values of type characteristics because
the diﬀerences among the types help us understand the key features of the behavior of
immigrants as well as the results of counterfactuals in the following sections.
In the value of living in the home country function, estimated values of country dummies
are all as expected. Non-EU countries have much lower values because of not only the less
attractive economic conditions but also the insititutional diﬀerences. Within the EU group,
Greece is less attractive compared to the other two and within the non-EU group Yugoslavia
is less attractive. In the former case, economic conditions are more likely to be the cause
while political conditions probably play a more important role in the latter case. With
respect to the value of earnings in the home country after return, the estimated parameters
and the age distribution at the time of return imply that 13 percent of Turkish return
migrants receive some level of utility form employment earnings after return. Dustmann and
Kirsckampf report, based on a sample of Turkish return migrants, that only 6 percent were
salaried workers. In their study, return migrants were sampled two years after their return
from Germany. Therefore, my estimate provides an upper bound to theirs and is consistent
with the number they report.
23I assumed that immigrants diﬀer in terms of their unobserved permanent characteristics
with respect to their psychic costs of living in Germany, bequest motive, marginal utility of
consumption and labor market ability. According to the estimated parameteres Table 6.2.1
ranks the four types for each of these characteristics and Figure 6.2.1 displays the hazard
f u n c t i o na n dm e a ns a v i n g sp r o ﬁle for all immigrants by type.
Type 2 and type 4 immigrants can be classiﬁed as returners. They have higher psychic
costs compared to the stayer types. Moreover, they have a lower bequest motive and a
higher marginal utility of consumption which also increases their willingness to return and
decumulate their asset holdings. While the psychic costs of type 2 immigrants do not change
much over their life cycle, type 4 immigrants show a faster acclimatization to Germany.
This causes the decline in the hazard function in the ﬁrst 10 periods for type 4 immigrants.
Another distinguishing feature of type 2 immigrants from type 4 immigrants is their higher
savings ability due to higher labor market ability. As a result of this, more of the type 2
immigrants are middle-aged workers who return to live on their accumulated wealth in their
home country. Type 4 immigrants have very high return rates after retirement because the
diﬀerence between the values of staying and returning is the smallest and, therefore, the
increase in the value of returning at retirement makes the biggest diﬀerence for this group.
One key feature of the saving decision by type is that while the proﬁle is relatively
ﬂat over time for stayers, it is downward sloping for the returner types. In fact, returner
types dissave in later periods. This is especially prominent for type 2 immigrants whose
higher saving ability compared to the other returner type let them accumulate more assets
in earlier periods. The marginal utility of holding assets changes over time because that
utility depends on the length of the remaining lifetime and after a certain age the marginal
utility of dissaving assets exceeds the marginal utility of holding them for immigrants with
relatively low bequest motives and high marginal utility of consumption. That is the returner
types, especially type 2 immigrants, start dissaving after a certain age. Another reason to
the downward-sloping proﬁle of type 2 immigrants is the out-selection dynamics within this
type. Some can save faster than others due to their higher earnings and/or lower minimum
consumption needs. Those that can save the fastest also return the earliest. As the highest
savers are selected out, savings of the remaining ones decrease. A comparison of the saving
behavior of stayer types reveals that type 1 immigrants save more than type 3 immigrants
because they have higher earnings. Besides, their bequest motive is higher.
If return migration is in fact part of an optimal life cycle plan of asset accumulation in
24t h eh o s tc o u n t r y ,w ew o u l de x p e c tt h er e t u r n e r st os a v em o r et h a nt h es t a y e r sa n dt h i si s
what we see in Figure 6.2.1. Despite having lower income, type 2 immigrants save more than
type 3 immigrants and have higher asset holdings except for toward the end of their lifetime
at which time their strong decumulation motive causes a fall in their asset holdings.
Table 6.2.2 lists the proportion of each type by nationality over duration of residence.
At arrival, the fraction of returner types, types 2 and 4, is higher among EU immigrants.
Their share is around forty percent for ex-Yugoslavian immigrants and sixty-one percent for
Turkish immigrants. This share rises to eigthy pecent for Italian immigrants, it is above
eighty-ﬁve percent for Greek and above ninety percent for Spanish immigrants. Among the
returner types, a higher share is type 2 among non-EU immigrants, especially so for Turkish
immigrants. For Greek immigrants, type 2 and type 4 immigrants are half and half whereas
Spanish and Italian immigrants have a higher share of type 4 immigrants, especially Italians.
One key diﬀerence between the two returner types is their labor market ability. Type
2 immigrants have higher income. Both stayer types have even higher income. Since EU
immigrants have a lower fraction of type 2 immigrants among the returners as well as a lower
fraction of stayers, they have lower incomes on average at arrival. This is consistent with the
ﬁndings of literature on guest-workers. Martin (1980) reports that there was a high demand
in Turkey for emigration during the recruitment scheme, which meant that German agencies
could be selective.24 Paine (1974) reports a similar experience for Yugoslavia in that most
of the urban migrants belonged to the skilled elite rather than the unemployed. Therefore,
there was positive selection in the immigration of guestworkers from non-EU countries. On
the other hand, a higher fraction of the immigrants coming from the EU countries were
villagers from poor areas of these countries.
7 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
Here, I discuss two important implications of immigrants’ return and savings behavior. One
is important from the host country’s perpective, net contributions of immigrants to the
pension insurance and unemployment insurance systems, and the other is important from
24According to Martin (1980) “With 10 Turks wanting to work in Germany for each one recruited by
employers, the Germans could be selective, and they were. Some 30 to 40 percent of the Turks recruited to
work in Germany were skilled workers in Turkey who worked as manual laborers in Germany. By 1970, for
example, 40 percent of Turkey’s carpenters and stonemasons were employed in Germany, often as assembly
line or unskilled workers.”
25the source countries’ perpective, how much assets immigrants bring with them when they
return.
7.1 Net Pension and Unemployment Insurance Contributions
In this section, I analyze the value at arrival of immigrants’ net lifetime pension and unem-
ployment insurance contributions. Figure 7.1.1 presents the net contributions to the pension
and unemployment insurances separately by country of origin and age at entry.
Net contributions of non-EU immigrants to the pension insurance system are much higher.
Non-EU immigrants have shorter life spans; therefore, their lifetime pension beneﬁts are
lower. In addition, higher return rates of EU immigrants in the early periods imply that they
contribute for a shorter duration of time. A shorter contribution period implies that when
the net contribution of each additional year of residence is positive, lifetime contributions
will include a fewer number of positive net contributions and, therefore, will be lower. The
net contribution from staying one more year is higher in the earlier periods, except for period
three which is the qualiﬁcation period. However, staying longer than that makes up for the
negative contribution in period three. The contribution of each additional year is lower at
later periods because immigrants are more likely to be unemployed and, therefore, making no
contributions. Besides each additional year’s contribution at later periods is discounted more
whereas the increase in present value of beneﬁts caused by an additional year of residence
does not depend on the total duration of residence.
A sc a na l s ob es e e ni nt h eﬁgure, net contributions of younger age-at-entry groups to
the pension insurance are higher. Holding income constant, older age-at-entry groups will
claim lower beneﬁts after retirement due to their shorter contribution periods; therefore,
the net contribution of each additional year of residence is higher for them. On the other
hand, a shorter contribution period also implies that, when the net contribution of each
additional year of residence is positive, lifetime contribution will include a fewer number of
positive net contributions. Moreover,.since the fraction of worklife spent as unemployed is
lower for younger age-at-entry groups, their contributions are higher. The last two facts
dominates the ﬁrst one and as can be seen from the ﬁgure net contributions fall as age-at-
entry inceases. This decline in net contributions as age-at-entry increases is faster for non-EU
immigrants. This is caused by the fact that non-EU immigrants that enter at younger ages
have signiﬁcantly higher incomes than older age-at-entry cohorts of non-EU immigrants;
whereas the income gap according to age-at-entry for EU immigrants is much smaller.
26Another interesting feature of Figure 7.1.1 is that net contributions after middle age-at-
entry values for Italians rise unlike those for the Greek and Spanish. For all EU groups,
incomes at entry for older age-at-entry groups are higher. However, for Italian immigrants,
the diﬀerence between the incomes of older age-at-entry groups and younger age-at-entry
groups is bigger. In addition, the diﬀerence between the return rates of older and younger
age-at-entry cohorts is bigger as well. Younger age-at-entry groups of Italian immigrants are
much more likely to return, keeping their contributions at a low level.
Next, I examine the net contributions of immigrants to the unemployment insurance
system. The two key features of the ﬁgure are that immigrants from non-EU countries have
much lower net contributions and that net contributions decrease as immigrants’ age at
entry increases for all nationalities. Both features result from the employment transition of
immigrants as shown above in Figure 4.1.1. Unemployment rates of non-EU immigrants are
higher than those of EU immigrants and since all immigrants are much more likely to be
unemployed at older ages, older age-at-entry cohorts spend a larger fraction of their residence
in Germany as unemployed.
An interesting feature of Figure 7.1.2 is that for immigrants who enter before the age
of 34, Turkish immigrants have higher net contributions than ex-Yugoslavian immigrants
whereas afterwards it is vice versa. Unemployment rates of Turkish immigrants are higher
regardless of age at entry. However, their return rates are also higher. Unemployment really
becomes an issue at older ages and among the younger age-at-entry cohorts, a much higher
fraction of Turkish immigrants return before reaching older ages compared to ex-Yugoslavian
immigrants. For instance, for those who enter at the age of 18, sixty percent of the Turkish
immigrants return by the age of ﬁfty whereas only thirty-ﬁve percent of the ex-Yugoslavian
immigrants return by the same age. For older age-at-entry cohorts higher return rates of
Turkish immigrants do not matter as much because unemployment rates immediately get
higher and there is a smaller diﬀerence between the hazard rates of the two nationalities for
o l d e ra g e - a t - e n t r yc o h o r t s .T h i si sa n o t h e rf e a t u r et h a te m p h a s i z e st h ei m p o r t a n c eo fr e t u r n
behavior in determining the impact of immigration.
In order to get a more aggregate look at immigrants’ impact on the host country social
security system, I combine the net contributions to the pension and unemployment insurance
systems.25 The results are displayed in Figure 7.1.2. Younger age-at-entry cohorts make
25The only element of the social security system we are missing here is the health insurance system. Since
participation in this insurance system entitles not only the immigrant himself but also his family to beneﬁts,
27higher net contributions for all nationalites. The decline by age-at-entry is faster for non-EU
immigrants. All age-at-entry groups of Spanish immigrants make positive contributions; for
Italian immigrants those who were younger than 48 at arrival and for Greek immigrants those
who were younger than 44 make positive net contributions. This age-at-entry threshold falls
to 34 for Turkish and 28 for ex-Yugoslavian immigrants. The highest contributions are made
by Turkish immigrants who enter Germany at very young ages. The net lifetime contribution
of a Turkish immigrant who enter Germany at the age of 18 to the German pension and
unemployment insurances together is just below 22,000DM26 a tt h et i m eo fh i se n t r y .
Next, I aggregate the values in Figure 7.1.2 to the country of origin level. These are
reported in Table 7.1.1. I ﬁnd that all nationalities but the ex-Yugoslavians make positive
net contributions. The levels are higher for EU countries. Spanish immigrants who have the
highest propensity to return and lowest unemployment rates contribute the most by 11,712
DM on average.
The studies done so far that investigate the impact of immigration on the host country
social security system (Storesletten, 2000; Lee and Miller, 2000) treat return migration as
exogenous. In order to analyze the impact of a such a restriction, I eliminate the return
migration decision in the model and instead take a constant hazard rate for each nationality
that preserves the lifetime survivor rate. What I ﬁnd is that such a restriction cause a
serious underestimation of net contributions of immigrants to both insurance programs. The
problem with this restriction is that even though it preserves the level of return migration,
it completely ignores the timing of and selection in return migration. The hazard rates
of EU immigrants in the ﬁrst couple of periods are very high. In fact, 34 percent of all
EU immigrants return within the ﬁrst four year years. These immigrants contribute to the
social security system during their residence in Germany but return before qualifying to
receive pension beneﬁts. Missing this fact causes a huge drop in the net pension insurance
contribution of these immigrants. For instance, for Italian immigrants, net contrib utions
to the pension insurance sytem drop from 6,165DM to 2,671DM. Similarly, missing the out-
selection of immigrants with worse labor market outcomes causes an underestimation of
their net contribution to the unemployment insurance system. Turkish net unemployment
calculation of the time proﬁle of beneﬁts would require modeling the dynamics of the family structure.
It is not clear which way inclusion of the net contribution to the health insurance system would tip
the balance. Immigrants’ shorter life span implies lower beneﬁts. On the other hand, they have a higher
dependency ratio.
261998 prices
28insurance contributions go down from -15,617DM to -21,177DM.
7.2 Asset Accumulation
Figure 7.2.1 illustrates immigrants’ saving rates over duration of residence in Germany by
EU status. Immigrants’ saving rates are very high.right after arrival. They save one third
of their income in the ﬁrst two years in Germany. Their saving rate drops gradually to
10 percent after 20 years of residence for both EU and non-EU immigrants. However, the
saving rates of EU and non-EU immigrants start to deviate after this time. After 20 years
of residence, the saving rate of non-EU immigrants keeps falling and it approaches zero after
30 years of residence whereas for EU immigrants the saving rate stays around 10 percent
between 20 and 30 years of residence, then decreases to 5 percent after 40 years of residence
and stays at that level thereafter.
As we saw in Figure 6.2.1, returner types save more in the earlier periods but less in later
periods. In fact, they dissave in later periods. Consequently, their assets proﬁle over duration
of residence is hump-shaped. Moreover, the selection dynamics makes the hump-shape more
pronounced. In the later periods there is a higher fraction of type 4 immigrants — the returner
type with low earnings and assets— among the returners. This decreases the level of assets
of returners in later periods even more. On the other hand, stayer types continue saving
all throughout their residence. As a result, their proﬁle is monotonically increasing. This
is why when we compare the asset holdings of stayers with those of returners by EU status
in Figure 7.2.2, we see that assets of returners increase at a faster pace compared to those
of stayers and the diﬀerence reaches a maximum at around 10 periods after arrival. After
this time, the diﬀerence starts shrinking and in fact, after the 13th period, asset holdings
of returners start decreasing and assets of stayers overtake those of returners. Among the
returners, asset holdings are the highest for those who return after between 20 and 30 years
of residence for both EU and non-EU immigrants. Asset holdings of these return migrants
top 120,000DM.
T h eh u m p - s h a p eo ft h ea s s e tp r o ﬁle for returners is more prominent for non-EU immi-
grants because they have a higher fraction of type 2 immigrants —returner type with higher
savings capacity— and this type has the fastest downward-sloping saving proﬁle. Asset hold-
ings of stayers, though increasing in both cases, exhibit signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the rate
of it. It increases at a much faster pace for EU stayers because EU stayers have a higher
fraction of type 1 stayers —who have the highest earnings and lowest margninal utility of
29consumption of all types— and this type of stayers have higher savings all throughout their
residence compared to the other type of stayer.
Table 7.21 reports the average asset holdings of a returner. Immigrants from both non-
EU countries take home on average more than 90,000DM. Greek immigrants take home
slightly more, at just above 94,000DM. Italian return migrants take home on average much
lower assets because they are much more likely to return at earlier periods. Due to the same
reason, even though Spanish migrants return home with higher assets.conditional on duration
of residence, the average level of assets of Spanish return migrants is lower at 84,000DM than
those of immigrants from non-EU countries.
Table 7.2.2 reports the average assets that return to the host country from all immigrants
that leave for the host country. Greek and Spanish workers who leave their country to work
in the host country bring back the highest amount of assets because they are more likely to
return and their returners accumulate more assets in the host country as there is a higher
fraction returning at later periods
8 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This section analyzes the impact of a number of counterfactual policy experiments. The
results of these counterfactuals are driven from the changes in the return migration and
savings choices of existing immigrants in Germany. However, changes in the surrounding
institutional framework could very well aﬀect the initial immigration decision to Germany,
and, therefore, the distribution of observed as well as unobserved characteristics of immi-
grants. This is not particularly problematic in this study due to the institutional framework
and the macroeconomic changes that have taken place. Immigration from non-EU coun-
tries to Germany is not possible anymore except for family uniﬁcation purposes. Although
immigration is still possible for the citizens of the EU countries, due to the improvements
that took place in the economies of these countries since the guestworkers, there is little
immigration pressure. Therefore, these policies would make little impact on the composition
of immigrants in Germany originating from the ﬁve source countries in this study. Nonethe-
less, these policy changes would inﬂuence the behavior of current immigrants to Germany,
like those from the new accession states to EU. On the other hand, the counterfactuals on
ﬁnancial bonuses could be limited to particular nationalities or to immigrants with longer
duration of residence to target the guestworkers. The other couterfactuals I conduct from
30the host country perpective include those with regard to the rules of the unemployment
insurance system. These policies are suggested not with the intent of targeting particulary
the immigrants but the overall population. Therefore, these are not analyzed to see whether
or not they are good policy tools for immigrants; but, to ﬁnd out their impact on immigrants
currently in Germany given that such policies are in fact in the German political agenda.
8.1 Financial Bonuses to Encourage Return
As it was reported in the introduction, unemployment rates of immigrants in Germany are
very high. Unemployed workers in Germany draw signiﬁcant amount of beneﬁts for extended
periods of time. Moreover, they do not pay pension insurance taxes but their unemploy-
m e n tp e r i o dc o u n t st o w a r dt h ec o n t r i b u t i o np e r i o du s e di nc a l c u l a t i n gp e n s i o nb e n e ﬁts.
Therefore, each additional year of residence of an unemployed worker has a negative net
contribution to the pension insurance system as well. In addition, there is strong persistence
in the unemployment state, especially for older working-age immigrants, which implies that
negative net contributions to the both insurance sytems will likely to persist in the future.
Therefore, rather than incurring these net contributions for extended periods of time, the
German government could provide ﬁnancial bonuses to unemployed immigrants conditional
on return. This would potentially be a less-expensive way to deal with the unemployment
of immigrants for the taxpayers in Germany.
In fact, this would potentially be a less-expensive way to deal with the unemployment
of not only immigrants but also natives in Germany. In other words, such policies could be
implemented on the whole population, including the natives. However, the peculiar thing
about immigrants is that they prefer to live in their home country. The estimation results
indicate that they show a willingness to live in their countries even after long periods of
residence in Germany. Therefore, it will be much less cheaper to implement such policies for
immigrants than natives. In general, this could be an eﬀective policy in economic downturns
when the unemployment rates rise.
8.1.1 One-Time Policy
In this policy, ﬁnancial bonuses conditional on return are provided at a single period in time
to all immigrants with unemployment spells longer than two years.27 Table 8.1.1 presents
27It is assumed that immigrants do not expect the implementation of such a policy.
31the impact of various amount of bonuses on the net contributions to the pension and unem-
ployment insurance systems according to the period the bonus is implemented. An entry is
in bold if that amount of bonus is the best one at that period.
As can be seen from the table, the optimal amount of bonus for both Turkish and
ex-Yugoslavian immigrants is around 45,000 to 50,000DM. For Turkish immigrants, this
amount of bonus makes a positive contribution regardless of the duration of residence. For
ex-Yugoslavian immigrants, it makes a positive contribution except for the latest period,
where the change is negligible. Therefore, for non-EU immigrants we can conclude that
this policy is going to increase their net contributions to the pension and unemployment
insurance systems regardless of the distribution of duration of residence when the policy is
implemented.
For EU immigrants, the optimal amount of bonus increases with duration of residence. A
bonus of 40,000DM increases net contributions at all periods but the very early and late ones.
To prevent the decrease in net contributions in early periods, the policy for EU immigrants
could be restricted to those with at least 6 periods of residence. Moreover, since the bonus
is also restricted to those younger than 58, there will be few immigrants who qualify for the
bonus at later periods. Therefore, the small decreases in net contributions of EU immigrants
that recieve the bonus at later periods will be dominated by the increases for those who
receive them at earlier periods and the total change in net contributions for EU immigrants
will be positive as well.
T h a tt h ep o l i c yi sm o r ee ﬀective for non-EU immigrants is expected because their unem-
ployment rates are higher. Moreover, the purchasing power of the bonus is higher in non-EU
countries. Also, conditional on type, non-EU immigrants have lower asset levels. Therefore,
the marginal eﬀect of the bonus is stronger.
At earlier periods, unemployment rates are lower; therefore, fewer people are qualiﬁed
to receive the bonus. On the other hand, the eﬀectiveness of the bonus is stronger because
at earlier periods asset holdings are lower on average. For Turkish immigrants, it is more
eﬀective at earlier periods. In fact, the biggest improvement in net contributions take place
if the bonus is received at period 6. Since unemployment rates of Turkish immigrants rise
faster, a higher fraction of them is qualiﬁed to receive the bonus. The most eﬀective period
is 12 for ex-Yugoslavian, Greek and Spanish immigrants and 14 for Italian immigrants when
unemployment rates reach signiﬁcant levels.
Even though the policy makes a positive impact on the net contributions of immigrants to
32the two insurance systems, the magnitude of the change is modest. For Turkish immigrants,
the improvement is bounded above by 221DM per person. (This would be the case if all
immigrants had 6 periods of residence at the time of the receipt of the bonus.). However,
this is only part of the big picture Unemployed immigrants do not pay income taxes either.
Moreover, their lower income implies that they will be more likely to receive other forms of
welfare.
Table 8.1.2 compares the baseline unemployment rates of Turkish immigrants to those
under a 45,000DM bonus that everybody receives at the 6th period. As a result of the bonus,
unemployment rate at the 6th period goes down from 4.1 to 3.4 percent. This is an important
drop in the unemployment rate. However, one thing that yields the policy less eﬀective can be
seen in the following periods. Even though more unemployed immigrants return the period
the policy is implemented, fewer unemployed immigrants return in the following periods. In
the following periods the gap between the baseline and bonus unemployment rates shrink as
a result of higher out-selection of unemployed immigrants in the baseline case. Out-selection
o fu n e m p l o y e di m m i g r a n t sa f t e rt h e6 t hp e r i o di sl o w e ri nt h eb o n u sc a s eb e c a u s es o m eo f
the unemployed immigrants that return in the baseline case after the 6th period already left
at the 6th period in the bonus case. In fact, a comparison of the hazard functions indicates
that after the increase in the hazard rate at the 6th period, hazard rates fall.
8.1.2 Policy In Eﬀect All the Time
Unlike the previous case, immigrants now know that whenever they are unemployed for the
last 2 years, they will be able to receive the bonus conditional on returning. Table 8.1.2
lists the change in total net contributions to the two insurance systems when an upper limit
is imposed on the age at which the bonus can be received. This age limit prevents the
immigrants with long spells of unemployment from ﬁrst collecting unemployment beneﬁts
a n dt h e nt a k i n gt h eﬁnancial bonus just before retirement and returning. On the other hand,
it limits the reach of the program because those who are ﬁrst-time unemployed after the age
limit can not receive it. The entries taken in boxes are the best values for each nationality
over all age limits.
As can be seen from Table 8.1.2, bonuses with a lower maximum age limit are more
eﬀective for non-EU countries. Since non-EU immigrants are more likely to be unemployed
at earlier ages, compared to EU immigrants, they become more likely to take advantage of
t h ef a c tt h a tt h e yc a nﬁr s tr e c i e v et h eb e n e ﬁt sa n dt h e nt h eb o n u sa sw e l l .I na d d i t i o n ,t h e r e
33are fewer new qualiﬁers after the limit age because those who are unemployed after the age
limit are more likely to be unemployed before that due to longer unemployment spells.
Another ﬁnding of the experiment is that when the maximum age limit is lowered, higher
amounts of bonuses become optimal. A lower age limit forces the unemployed immigrants
to return earlier, which means that a longer stream of unemployment beneﬁts will not be
paid. Therefore, the government can instead pay higher amount of bonuses.
According to country of origin, the policy is most eﬀective for ex-Yugoslavian immigrants.
Since the return rates are the lost for this nationality, less is paid to those who would return
anyway. In addition, lor prices in the source country yields a higher marginal eﬀect of the
bonus on immigrants’ return behavior for this group. When a bonus of 30,000DM is limited
to those younger than 52, the net contribution of an ex-Yugoslavian immigrant increases
by 155DM. Hover, for other nationalites the increase is rather small. It is always less than
55DM per person on average. Among the EU immigrants, the policy is more eﬀective for
Italians because they have a higher fraction of returner types with low incomes. For these
types, accumulated assets are lor; therefore, the marginal por of the bonus is stronger.
Next, instead of putting age restrictions I put a restriction on duration of residence,
which is 10 years. This restriction is more binding for younger age-at-entry cohorts because
it implies a lower age limit for them. The results of such a policy is presented in Table 8.1.3
below. Compared to the above table, the biggest change takes place for Turkish immigrants.
Now, the amount of increase in net total contributions is 105DM per person on average. Since
Turkish immigrants have the highest unemployment rates and are more likely to unemployed
within the ﬁrst ten years of residence, the reach of the program is less limited for them and
receiving both the unemployment beneﬁts for long periods and the bonus is prevented.
Increasing the amount of bonuses yields the program more eﬀective in the sense that
there are more returners. On the other hand, it also means that a higher amount of bonus
is paid to immigrants who would leave even without the bonus. Which of these eﬀects dom-
inates depends on how many additional returners there are with the incremental increase in
the amount of bonus. Both Table 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 indicate that higher amount of bonuses
a r em o r ee ﬀective for non-EU immigrants. It does not pay to give higher amount of bonuses
to EU immigrants because while it increases the bonuses received by those who would re-
turn anyway, it does very little diﬀerence in terms of encouraging the would-be-stayers to
return. On the other hand, making incremental increases in the amount of bonus to non-EU
immigrants yields higher returns in terms of changing the return behavior.
348.2 Elimination of Unemployment Assistance
Elimination of unemploymet assistance, which is the second phase of the unemployment in-
surance system, is proposed in Germany. Given the high unemployment rates of immigrants,
this could potentially have an important inﬂuence on immigrants’ aggregate return behavior
as well as on their unemployment rate due to the selection process in return.
Simulation results indicate that elimination of unemployment assistance will have a very
small impact on immigrants’ return behavior. For instance, for Turkish immigrants, who
have the highest unemploymet rates of all nationalities, there are seven additional returners
at some point in their lifetime out of every 10,000 immigrants. Neither does the policy make
much of an impact on the timing of return. In no period does the hazard rate increase
by more than one percent and in most periods there is no change. Moreover, the policy is
not eﬀective in selecting out the unemployed in return. There is virtually no change in the
unemployment rates of immigrants after the policy is implemented. This is expected given
the small impact of the policy on the return behavior of immigrants and that such a policy
has an impact on the currently employed workers as well as the unemployed.
The reason to the small change is that elimination of unemployment assistance does not
leave the immigrants with zero income. The welfare system has one more level of protection
which is the subsistence income. For instance, an unemployed immigrant with 30,000DM
per year previous employment earnings would get 18,000DM as unemployment assistance.
On the other hand, subsistence income for an immigrant family with two children would be
at least 17,500DM. On the other hand, the earnings of an unemployed single immigrant fall
down to 6,250DM. Therefore, this policy makes an impact only on immigrants with small
families.
8.3 Exchange Rate Premiums by the Source Countries
Many source country governments have implemented policies in the form of exchange rate
premiums in order to attract the wealth that immigrants accumulate in the host country. In
this section, I analyze how this policy inﬂuence the amount of wealth that is brought back
by the returning immigrants.
Table 8.3.1 displays the eﬀect of a 5 percent premium on the exchange rate parity on the
lifetime survival rate and accumulated wealth of immigrants. The premium on the exchange
rate implies a higher purchasing power to the wealth accumulated in Germany when taken
35back to the home country. This increases the value of returning back to the home country
and, as can be seen from the table, the survivor rate of all nationalites but the Italians
decrease. On the other hand, the premium decreases the average amount of wealth that is
taken home by the returners. This is because the increase in the purchasing power parity
changes the timing of immigrants’ return. Immigrants can now return at earlier periods due
to the higher ppp. This also means that returners have on average lower wealth. This works
against the fact that there are more returners. Moreover, the former eﬀect dominates the
latter. As can be seen from Table 8.3.1, the average amount of wealth that is taken back
by all emigrants from the home country, named as "Average Returned Wealth" in the table,
decreases with the premium. In other words, the home country governments hurt themselves
by these premiums. This is simply a result of the fact that these premiums not only aﬀect
the level of return but also the timing of it and it is this change in the timing that brings
about the decrease in the amount of wealth taken to the home country.
This policy could also aﬀect the behavior of immigrants who choose to stay in Germany
throughout their lives. If these immigrants keep more of their savings in their home countries
due to the exchange rate premium, this would work against the conclusion above. However,
it is unlikely that immigrants who choose to stay in the host country throughout their lives
would keep their assets in their native country.
9 Counterfactuals on the Macroeconomic Environment
This section examines how return migration and saving choices of immigrants respond to
changes in the macroeconomic environment pertaining to their decision making. These
macroeconomic variables are wages in Germany, expected wages at the home country and
the purchasing power parity between Germany and the home countries.
9.1 A Change in German Wages
First, I analyze the eﬀect of a change in the rental price of human capital in Germany on
immigrants’ return and savings decisions. The theoretical impact of an increase in the price
of human capital in Germany on immigrants’ return decision is ambiguous. On one hand,
a higher income in Germany allows the immigrants to save faster and have higher asset
holdings at each period. This increases the value of returning more than value of staying
due to lower prices in the home country. In addition, a higher income implies higher pension
36beneﬁts which increases the value of returning more due to the very same reason. On the
other hand, since the opportunity cost of returning increases with higher wages in Germany,
immigrants become more likely to stay.
Figure 9.1.1 illustrates the change in the hazard functions according to EU status after a
ten percent increase in German wages. For both groups, the hazard rates in the ﬁrst couple
of periods are lower because the ability to save at a faster pace increases the continuation
value of staying in Germany and makes the immigrants more patient. This decline is more
apparent for EU immigrants because they have a higher fraction of early returners. Non-EU
immigrants’ hazard function peaks earlier at a lower level. It peaks earlier because the ability
to save at a faster pace shortens the average duration of residence of returners. It peaks at a
lower level because ﬁrst the substitution eﬀect dominates and second higher hazard rates at
earlier periods leaves a lower fraction of returners. Even though the hazard rates of non-EU
immigrants are slightly higher in periods 3 to 6, at no period is the hazard rate for EU
immigrants higher because income eﬀect is stronger for non-EU immigrants, who face even
lower prices in their home country.
Immigrants who choose stay instead of returning at earlier periods after the increase in
German wages start returning at later periods as they age and the importance of substitution
eﬀect diminishes as a result of shorter remaining worklife. Another reason to the dimishing
importance of the substitution eﬀect is rising unemployment rates with age. Even though
unemployment earnings increase by the same proportion, the amount of increase is smaller.
In addition, a higher level of future stream of pension beneﬁts brought about by higher
incomes make them more likely to return as well. (An increase in pension beneﬁts increases
the value of returning more due to lower prices in the home country.) This is why in both
graphs in Figure 9.1.1, hazard rates rise in later periods.
Since the income eﬀect of an increase in German wages is stronger for non-EU immigrants,
their survivor rate at certain periods is, in fact, lower. For instance, the survivor rate after
12 years decreases from 82.1 percent to 81.9 percent. However, in the following periods
hazard rates are lower and the increase in the hazard rates at retirement periods is not high
enough to make up for the diﬀerence and the lifetime survivor rate, as shown below in Table
9.1.1, increases from 46.3 percent to 46.7 percent. On the other hand, for EU immigrants
t h ei n c r e a s ei nt h eh a z a r dr a t e sa tl a t e rp e r i o d si sm o r et h a ne n o u g ht om a k eu pf o rt h e
decrease in earlier periods. As a result, the lifetime survivor rate, in fact, decreases for EU
immigrants from 14.4 percent to 14.2 percent. There are two main reasons to this diﬀerence
37between the EU groups: First, EU immigrants have a higher fraction of low-income returner
types who have high hazard rates at later periods; therefore, the increase in pension beneﬁts
makes a bigger impact. Second, since EU immigrants receive pension beneﬁts for a longer
time on average, the increase in them is more important compared to non-EU immigrants.
Figure 9.1.2 compares the mean savings proﬁle after an increase in wages with the baseline
proﬁle for non-EU and EU immigrants separately. The savings proﬁle of both EU and non-
EU immigrants become steeper. Higher savings ability let the immigrants save more in
earlier periods and in the case that they do not return, they end up with higher assets in
later periods. Therefore, they do not save as much in later periods. However, the extent
of this displays a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the returner and stayer types. Since the
returner types are saving as much as they can in the earlier periods, the increase in their
earnings brings about a signiﬁcantly larger increase in their savings. As a result, even though
the savings proﬁle of both returner and stayer types become steeper, the degree of it is larger
for returner types. Since EU immigrants have a larger fraction of returner types, the degree
of the rotation in their savings proﬁle is bigger.
Compared to high-income returner types, the crossing of the counterfactual and the base-
line savings proﬁles takes place at a later period for low-income returner types because the
amount of increase in their earnings is lower after the proportional increase and their accumu-
lated assets is lower at each period. Therefore, they keep saving at a higher level for a longer
time before saving at a lower level. Since the returners among the EU immigrants contain a
larger fraction of lower income immigrants, the crossing of the baseline and counterfactual
proﬁles for EU immigrants in Figure 9.1.2 takes place later at period 13 compared to period
6 for non-EU immigrants. Even though the counterfactual savings level are higher in the
ﬁrst 13 periods for EU immigrants, there is a signiﬁcant narrowing of the counterfactual
and baseline savings values in periods 5 to 8 because there is a signiﬁcant drop in the savings
level of returner types with higher earnings particularly at these periods.
9.2 A Change in Home Country Expected Wages
In this counterfactual, I gauge the sensitivity of immigrants’ return and savings decision on
expected wages in the home country. Figure 9.2.1 presents the change in the hazard functions
after a 25 percent increase in home country expected wages on the hazard functions according
to EU status. Since home country wages is more important for younger immigrants who face
a longer horizon of worklife after return, hazard rates increase more at earlier periods for
38both immigrant groups. On the other hand, hazard rates at later periods fall because wages
in the home country is not important for older immigrants as they do not plan to work after
return and many of extra leavers in earlier periods are those who would leave in later periods.
The surprising result of this counterfactual can be seen in Table 9.2.1 where I present the
lifetime survivior rate after a 25 percent increase in home country expected wage. Lifetime
survivor rates increase for both immigrant groups, especially for EU immigrants.
The increase in home country wages would make return to the home country more likely
by decreasing the wage diﬀerential. Moreover, there is not a direct eﬀect on savings ability in
Germany unlike the previous counterfactual on German wages. However, there is an indirect
eﬀect on the saving decision in Germany. Since an increase in home country wages increases
the likelihood of return, it increases the amount of savings of immigrants while in Germany.
This is illustrated in Figure 9.2.1 and the increase in savings can be easily seen in the ﬁgure
for EU immigrants. It makes a bigger impact for EU immigrants because since the level of
expected wages are higher in EU countries, the amount of change after a 25 percent increase
is higher there. This is why in Table 9.2.1, the increase in the survivor rate is bigger for
EU immigrants As a result of this change in saving decision, immigrants have higher asset
holdings at each period.
At younger ages, the value of bequesting assets is a smaller share of the total utility due
to the lower discount factor whereas the value of accumulated assets is higher because there
is a longer lifetime horizon during which these assets can be decumulated. As a result, the
increase in the value of accumulated assets resulting from a marginal rise in assets dominates
the increase in the value of bequesting and, therefore, an increase in assets makes immigrants
more likely to return to their home country and decumulate their assets. On the other hand,
as immigrants age, the value of bequesting captures a bigger share of total value while
the value of accumulated assets shrinks as the remaining lifetime shortens. Consequently,
at older ages an increase in assets increases the value of bequesting more than the value
of decumulating assets and immigrants become more likely to stay. This is why there are
additional stayers after the increase in home country expected wages as seen in Table 9.2.1.
These are the people who would return if the home country wages did not increase and they
did not save more in earlier periods.
399.3 A Change in Purchasing Power Parity
In this counterfactual, I analyze the eﬀect of a change in the purchasing power parity between
Germany and the source countries on the return and savings decisions of immigrants. Figures
9.3.1 and 9.3.2 compare the baseline mean savings proﬁl ea n dh a z a r df u n c t i o nw i t ht h o s e
under a 25 percent higher ppp. The ﬁgures are inclusive of all immigrant groups. The
ﬁn d i n g sh o l dw h e nt h ea n a l y s i si sm a d es e p a r a t e l yf o rE Ug r o u p s .
An increase in the ppp increases the value of accumulated wealth after return and, there-
fore, makes immigrants more likely to return. The increase in return rates is particularly
strong for returners with higher assets. This is why in Figure 9.3.1 hazard rates rise at
periods 3 to 9. However, higher hazard rates in these periods also implies that returners
are selected out faster and, therefore, constitute a smaller fraction of the immigrant sample
after the tenth period. Thus, hazard rates fall in later periods. Another feature of Figure
9.3.1 is the fall in the hazard rates in the ﬁrst couple periods. The reason to this is that a
higher purchasing power parity makes the early-leavers more patient because the returns to
waiting and accumulating assets increase.
Table 9.3.1 presents the change in levels of return migration. After the 25 percent increase
in ppp, the lifetime survivor rate of non-EU immigrants decreases from 0.463 to 0.456 while
it remains constant for EU immigrants. There are two main reasons for this diﬀerence
according to EU status. First of all, since this is a percentage increase and ppp levels are
lower for EU immigrants, the amount of change in smaller for them. Second, this change
makes the biggest impact on returners with higher assets. However, a smaller fraction of EU
immigrants fall into this group. Returners among EU immigrants are more strongly selected
among low asset holders as is illustrated in Figure ??.1. Consequently, the increase in ppp
brings about a change only in the timing of return migration for EU immigrants.
An increase in ppp has conﬂicting income and subsititution eﬀects on saving decision. A
higher ppp implies that immigrants could attain the same consumption levels in the home
c o u n t r yw i t hl o w e rs a v i n g si nG e r m a n ya n di n d u c e st h ei m m i g r a n t st os a v el e s s . O nt h e
other hand, immigrants save more as the opportunity cost of consumption increases. Figure
9.3.2 displays the cumulative eﬀect of these for all immigrants. As can be seen from the
ﬁgure, in the ﬁrst 10 periods, income eﬀect dominates and immigrants save less. This is
particularly apparent between the ﬁf t ha n dt e n t hp e r i o d s .
The increase in ppp makes a very small impact on the behavior of stayer types and the
returner types with low earnings. Stayer types have a very low probability of returning
40to their home country and therefore ppp is relatively insigniﬁcant in their consumption
smoothing over their lifetime. Even though it is an important factor for returner types with
low earnings, there occurs only a very small change in their saving behavior because they
are severely constrained in their saving ability. Therefore, most of the change in Figure
9.3.2 comes from the change in the behavior of returner type with higher savings. For these
immigrants, income eﬀect dominates and they save less in earlier periods. Their savings
particularly drop between periods 5 and 10, which is the source of change in these periods in
Figure 9.3.2. In the case that they stay in Germany until older ages, havings accumulated
lower assets, they dissave less. This is the primary reason why saving levels rise after the
tenth period.
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I estimated a dynamic stochastic model of joint return migration and savings
choices, in which the reasons to return include higher purchasing power of accumulated assets
in the home country due to lower prices there and immigrants’ higher willingness to live in
their home country. The immigrants whose behavior I analyze come from ﬁve diﬀerent source
countries that diﬀer in terms of their general attractiveness, potential earnings of immigrants
after return, purchasing power parity with Germany and life expectancy of immigrants.
I ﬁnd the level of return migration to be high for EU immigrants. 88 percent of the
Greek, 83 percent of the Italian and 92 percent of the Spanish immigrants return to their
home countries at some point in their lifetime. On the other hand, for non-EU immigrants the
return migration level is signiﬁcantly lower. 61 percent of the Turkish and only 41 percent of
ex-Yugoslavian immigrants return during their lifetime. There are interesting diﬀerences in
t h et i m i n go fr e t u r na sw e l l .T h eh a z a r df u n c t i o no fn o n - E Ui m m i g r a n t si sh u m p - s h a p e da n d
reaches its peak around 15 years of residence whe r e a sE Ui m m i g r a n t sh a v eaf a s t - d e c r e a s i n g
hazard function that levels oﬀ after 10 years of residence before slightly rising again at
retirement. The most prominent feature of immigrants’ saving behavior is that it displays
a decreasing trend over time. Immigrants’ saving rate is very high.right after arrival. They
save one third of their income in the ﬁrst two years in Germany. This saving rate falls to
10 percent after twenty years of residence and to 5 percent for EU immigrants and to zero
percent for non-EU immigrants after forty years of residence.
Immigrants bring back signiﬁcant amount of assets with their return to their home coun-
41try. This amount is 92,857 DM for Turkish immigrants and 91,407 DM for ex-Yugoslavian
immigrants. It displays a higher variation for EU countries: Italian immigrants, who have
higher return rates in earlier periods, take 42,619 DM while Greek immigrants take 94,093
DM and Spanish immigrants 84,129 DM to their home countries. The German Interior Min-
istry reports that around 45,000 Turks left the country annually between 1993 and 1998.
Assuming that this roughly corresponds to 10,000 households implies that the amount of
money that return migrants brought with them to Turkey was almost a billion DM per year
in this time interval. Since the literature also indicates that many of these return migrants,
in fact more than half for Turkish immigrants, set up small businesses with part of this
returned wealth, it would make an important contribution to the source country economy.
I ﬁnd that immigrants make positive contributions to the pension insurance system re-
gardless of their age-at-entry and country of origin. However, non-EU immigrants make
higher contributions than EU immigrants and younger age-at-entry cohorts make higher
contributions compared to older age-at-entry cohorts. In terms of net contributions to the
unemployment insurance system younger age-at-entry cohorts still make higher contributions
but this time EU immigrants make higher contributions than non-EU immigrants. In fact,
net contributions of non-EU immigrants are all negative except for the very young entrants.
When the net contributions to these two systems are taken together, all nationality groups
but ex-Yugoslavians make positive contributions. Net contributions of EU immigrants are
higher. I also ﬁnd that an exogenous modeling of return migration decision in the calculation
of lifetime net contributions, which has been the practice of literature so far, causes a serious
underestimation.
In counterctual policy experiments, I show that the German government can increase this
net contribution by providing ﬁnancial bonuses to unemployed immigrants conditional on
return. The policy is more eﬀective on non-EU immigrants. I ﬁnd that the optimal amount
of bonus for non-EU immigrants is between 45,000 and 50,000DM when the policy is applied
at a single point in time. Moreover, net contributions could also be increased by having such
a policy all the time. In this case, however, restrictions on qualiﬁcation such as maximum
age and maximum duration of residence would be required.
In other counterfactual policy experiments, I ﬁnd that the proposed elimination of unem-
ployment assistance program in Germany has a tiny impact on immigrants’ return behavior
and that exchange rate premiums provided by source country governments in order to boost
the entry of immigrants’ wealth in fact decreases the amount of returned wealth to the source
42country.
In the case of an increase in German wages, immigrants become less likely to return
at earlier periods but more likely to return at later periods. Their savings proﬁle becomes
steeper as a result of higher savings ability. The counterfactual in which I gauge the sensi-
tivity of immigrants’ return and savings choices on the expected wage in the home country
yields an interesting result. I ﬁnd that an increase in home country expected wages increases
the lifetime survivor rate in Germany. An increase in home country expected wages increases
return rates at younger ages. However, as a result of higher savings, immigrants end up with
higher asset holdings at older ages and become more likely to stay at these periods. This,
in fact, dominates the increase at earlier periods and brings about an increase in lifetime
survivor rate. An increase in ppp decreases the su r v i v o rr a t ea sw e l la st h ea v e r a g ed u r a t i o n
of residence of returners. With regard to its impact on saving behavior, I ﬁnd that income
eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect and immigrants’ savings decrease at earlier periods.
Having accumulated lower assets, they save more at older ages. Thus, the savings proﬁle
becomes ﬂatter.
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45TABLE 4.1: Data on PPP and Expected Wages in the Source Countries2829
 Turkey ex-Yugoslavia Greece Italy Spain
PPP 2.2 2.5 1.6 1.3 1.4
Expected Wage /
Expected Wage Turkey 10 . 81 . 11 . 61 . 3











































TABLE 4.1.1: Transition into Retirement
A g e 6 06 26 46 66 8
Retired 37.4% 51.7% 63.7% 91.8% 94.7%







5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
NON-EU EU
28Since most of the Italian immigrants are from the southern part of the country, we take the diﬀerences in
prices between the South and the North into consideration in generating the numbers for Italy. We roughly
take ppp 10% higher, wages 10% lower than the national averages.
29Expected wage ratio is at purchasing power parity.
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Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
48TABLE 6.2.2: Type Proportions over Duration of Residence
period 0 5 10 15 20 25
TURKISH
Type 1 0.033 0.363 0.049 0.064 0.080 0.100
Type 2 0.559 0.517 0.343 0.180 0.097 0.076
Type 3 0.349 0.413 0.575 0.725 0.806 0.824
Type 4 0.059 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.017 0.000
ex-YUGOSLAVIAN
Type 1 0.048 0.050 0.058 0.066 0.076 0.091
Type 2 0.320 0.284 0.176 0.096 0.052 0.039
Type 3 0.551 0.614 0.720 0.800 0.852 0.870
Type 4 0.082 0.052 0.046 0.038 0.020 0.000
GREEK
Type 1 0.039 0.057 0.084 0.126 0.216 0.368
Type 2 0.433 0.510 0.410 0.266 0.146 0.084
Type 3 0.105 0.159 0.238 0.353 0.492 0.547
Type 4 0.423 0.275 0.269 0.255 0.147 0.001
ITALIAN
Type 1 0.083 0.203 0.254 0.299 0.409 0.572
Type 2 0.022 0.041 0.027 0.013 0.007 0.003
Type 3 0.116 0.293 0.373 0.437 0.424 0.422
Type 4 0.779 0.463 0.346 0.252 0.161 0.003
SPANISH
Type 1 0.066 0.116 0.178 0.275 0.490 0.733
Type 2 0.299 0.416 0.344 0.248 0.149 0.088
Type 3 0.030 0.056 0.087 0.128 0.175 0.175
Type 4 0.606 0.412 0.391 0.349 0.186 0.003


























49FIGURE 7.1.2: Total Net Contributions to the Pension and Unemployment
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TABLE 7.1.1: Net Contributions by Country of Origin
Turkish ex-Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Net Pension Insurance 
Contribution 21,461            15,788            5,662              6,165              6,588             
Net Unemployment 
Insurance Contribution -15,617 -16,884 3,787              3,761              5,124             
Total Net Contribution 5,844 -1,095 9,449              9,927              11,712           
TABLE 7.1.2: Net Contributions If Return Migration Were Exogenous
Turkish ex-Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Net Pension Insurance 
Contribution 18,632            14,063            4,115              2,671              5,171             
Net Unemployment 
Insurance Contribution -21,177 -19,816 1,779              1,759              3,632             
Total Net Contribution -2,544 -5,753 5,895              4,431              8,803             
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TABLE 7.2.1: Average Asset Level of a Returner
Turkish ex-Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
92,857            91,407            94,093            42,619            84,129           
TABLE 7.2.2: Average Asset Level that Returns per Emigrant
Turkish ex-Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
56,689            37,669            82,585            35,271            77,096           
51TABLE 8.1.1: Total Net Pension and Unemployment Insurance Contribu-
tions with a One-Time Bonus30
period=4 period=6
Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713 Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713
30,000 5,904 -1,065 9,451 9,923 11,713 25,000 5,950 -1,036 9,469 9,933 11,725
35,000 5,916 -1,055 9,449 9,919 11,711 30,000 5,985 -1,011 9,476 9,930 11,725
40,000 5,925 -1,051 9,445 9,913 11,708 35,000 6,023 -993 9,478 9,927 11,722
45,000 5,938 -1,050 9,441 9,909 11,705 40,000 6,057 -983 9,478 9,924 11,717
50,000 5,943 -1,052 9,437 9,905 11,699 45,000 6,065 -979 9,475 9,919 11,710
55,000 5,938 -1,057 9,430 9,896 11,696 50,000 6,057 -983 9,467 9,912 11,704
period=8 period=10
Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713 Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713
30,000 5,970 -1,030 9,467 9,937 11,719 30,000 5,920 -1,017 9,483 9,937 11,725
35,000 6,003 -1,005 9,478 9,938 11,721 35,000 5,943 -981 9,494 9,941 11,734
40,000 6,034 -991 9,485 9,935 11,718 40,000 5,964 -947 9,510 9,942 11,738
45,000 6,053 -989 9,479 9,930 11,714 45,000 5,980 -938 9,520 9,940 11,733
50,000 6,033 -998 9,470 9,922 11,706 50,000 5,972 -943 9,510 9,939 11,723
55,000 5,997 -1,010 9,461 9,917 11,697 55,000 5,945 -957 9,492 9,936 11,714
period=12 period=14
Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713 Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713
30,000 5,891 -1,009 9,525 9,953 11,779 40,000 5,891 -991 9,503 9,974 11,732
35,000 5,906 -972 9,544 9,963 11,779 45,000 5,915 -955 9,514 9,985 11,732
40,000 5,924 -927 9,553 9,964 11,780 50,000 5,919 -945 9,529 9,998 11,738
45,000 5,941 -901 9,562 9,967 11,785 55,000 5,893 -951 9,541 10,003 11,735
50,000 5,934 -904 9,568 9,965 11,777 60,000 5,857 -970 9,543 10,000 11,726
55,000 5,904 -921 9,553 9,963 11,766 65,000 5,821 -998 9,538 9,986 11,715
period=16 period=18
Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslavi Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713 Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713
25,000 5,854 -1,071 9,472 9,949 11,715 20,000 5,846 -1,096 9,452 9,933 11,711
30,000 5,853 -1,070 9,473 9,945 11,711 25,000 5,846 -1,096 9,452 9,930 11,711
35,000 5,853 -1,067 9,472 9,944 11,708 30,000 5,847 -1,096 9,452 9,932 11,711
40,000 5,860 -1,063 9,467 9,953 11,706 35,000 5,847 -1,097 9,451 9,931 11,711
45,000 5,866 -1,052 9,465 9,958 11,706 40,000 5,848 -1,097 9,451 9,931 11,709
50,000 5,867 -1,051 9,464 9,966 11,703 45,000 5,848 -1,098 9,449 9,928 11,709
55,000 5,855 -1,054 9,456 9,969 11,697 50,000 5,848 -1,099 9,448 9,926 11,709
60,000 5,837 -1,065 9,456 9,959 11,696 55,000 5,846 -1,101 9,446 9,925 11,707
TABLE 8.1.2: Baseline and Bonus Unemployment Rates of Turkish Immi-
grants
P e r i o d 56789 1 0
Baseline 2.7% 4.1% 5.8% 8.4% 11.7% 16.3%
Bonus 2.7% 3.4% 5.3% 8.0% 11.3% 16.0%
30In this policy experiment, bonuses are restricted to those younger than 58. Therefore, the last period
an immigrant can receive a bonus is period 19.
52TABLE 8.1.2: Total Net Pension and Unemployment Insurance Contribu-
tions
Age < 54 Age < 56
Turkish Yugoslav Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslav Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713
5,000 5,846 -1,064 9,476 9,938 11,718 5,832 -1,066 9,473 9,945 11,706
10,000 5,833 -1,037 9,479 9,964 11,705 5,797 -1,044 9,483 9,961 11,701
15,000 5,827 -1,005 9,484 9,970 11,694 5,743 -1,026 9,475 9,976 11,693
20,000 5,817 -985 9,488 9,972 11,683 5,709 -1,011 9,479 9,980 11,670
25,000 5,790 -970 9,472 9,961 11,677 5,647 -1,010 9,461 9,947 11,652
30,000 5,750 -961 9,458 9,928 11,651 5,563 -1,027 9,421 9,929 11,622
35,000 5,690 -978 9,427 9,907 11,628
Age < 50 Age < 52
Turkish Yugoslav Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslav Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713
5,000 5,848 -1,075 9,467 9,943 11,714 5,849 -1,068 9,469 9,944 11,717
10,000 5,859 -1,045 9,462 9,963 11,715 5,858 -1,037 9,478 9,968 11,703
15,000 5,875 -1,027 9,471 9,969 11,705 5,868 -1,007 9,485 9,967 11,697
20,000 5,882 -996 9,467 9,957 11,695 5,878 -983 9,480 9,963 11,688
25,000 5,877 -975 9,456 9,946 11,693 5,872 -962 9,473 9,954 11,681
30,000 5,878 -958 9,456 9,936 11,678 5,839 -941 9,463 9,932 11,669
35,000 5,876 -953 9,445 9,918 11,653 5,807 -943 9,447 9,920 11,647
40,000 5,846 -953 9,428 9,892 11,641
Age < 46 Age < 48
Turkish Yugoslav Greek Italian Spanish Turkish Yugoslav Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713
5,000 5,858 -1,087 9,460 9,941 11,714 5,856 -1,081 9,466 9,948 11,711
10,000 5,864 -1,071 9,457 9,942 11,712 5,862 -1,058 9,466 9,954 11,708
15,000 5,863 -1,059 9,457 9,944 11,707 5,873 -1,041 9,468 9,956 11,701
20,000 5,873 -1,051 9,450 9,934 11,701 5,889 -1,024 9,461 9,945 11,693
25,000 5,880 -1,036 9,450 9,927 11,696 5,890 -1,004 9,455 9,939 11,684
30,000 5,878 -1,025 9,442 9,915 11,685 5,888 -993 9,454 9,924 11,672
35,000 5,865 -1,016 9,426 9,903 11,667 5,886 -984 9,440 9,908 11,656
40,000 5,863 -1,017 9,413 9,886 11,656 5,872 -983 9,422 9,887 11,641
45,000 5,846 -996 9,398 9,858 11,624
TABLE 8.1.3: Total Net Pension and Unemployment Insurance Contribu-
tions When Bonus Can Be Received Only in the First Ten Years of Residence
Turkish ex-Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
Baseline 5,844 -1,096 9,450 9,928 11,713
5,000 5,866 -1,086 9,448 9,929 11,712
10,000 5,881 -1,074 9,444 9,929 11,710
15,000 5,894 -1,065 9,440 9,930 11,707
20,000 5,913 -1,055 9,437 9,924 11,703
25,000 5,925 -1,044 9,431 9,919 11,699
30,000 5,939 -1,039 9,425 9,909 11,690
35,000 5,949 -1,041 9,416 9,897 11,678
40,000 5,948 -1,048 9,405 9,882 11,668
Also restricted to age<56
53TABLE 8.3.1: Eﬀect of a Exchange Rate Premium on the Return of Wealth
to the Source Countries
Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
BASELINE
Survivor Rate 0.3895 0.5879 0.1223 0.1724 0.0836
Average Wealth of Returners 92,857         91,407         94,093         42,619         84,128        
Average Returned Wealth  56,689       37,669       82,585       35,271        77,095        
5% PREMIUM 
Survivor Rate 0.3874 0.5869 0.1218 0.1727 0.0832
Average Wealth of Returners 91,793         90,251         93,281         42,848         83,805        
Average Returned Wealth 56,232       37,283       81,919       35,448        76,832        































































54TABLE 9.1.1: Lifetime Survivor Rate After an Increase in German Wages
Non-EU EU
Baseline 0.463 0.144
10% Increase 0.467 0.142










































25% Increase 0.464 0.148































TABLE 9.3.1: Lifetime Survivor Rate After an Increase in PPP
Non-EU EU
Baseline 0.463 0.144
25% Increase 0.456 0.144











































µ5I(lt =0 )+µ2I(l6 =2 )+µ7I(age ≤ 24)+
µ8I(age ≤ 30) + µ9I(age ≥ 60) + µ10I(age ≥ 70)
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Employment transition before one becomes eligible for retirement is modeled as a probit.
l
∗
t = α0 + α1lt−1 + α2aget + α3age
2










A.5 Employment Transition with Retirement
I use a multinomial logit model for employment transition when retirement is possible.













exp(γ4(j−1)+1 + γ4(j−1)+2age0 + γ4(j−1)+3I(lt−1 =0 )+γ4(j−1)+4aget)
#
A.6 Human Capital
Ht = υ1t + υ2t











t), the vector of contemporaneous shocks to preferences and earnings, have the



















A.8 Preferences for Living in the Home Country
The value of living in the home country has four compenents: A baseline country dummy plus
the value of accumulated wealth in Germany —where wealth is interacted with purchasing
power parity between the source country and Germany—, the value of potential earnings in
the home country after return -which is shifted according to the ratio of expected wages in
source countries—, and the value of German pension beneﬁts —which is adjusted according
to the ratios of purchasing power parities—. Below is given the parametrization, which is












































∆age [π3,2 [1 + π3,3I(aget ≥ 64)](1 − exp(π3,4t))]
Above pppz is the purchasing power parity ratio between Germany and the source country
and ˆ wz is the expected wages in country z. Also,
paget =( last_age − aget)/2
58is the number of periods left till death and













is the discount factor for pension beneﬁts, which an immigrant can start receiving only after
age 64.
Note that the variation in the above value according to nationality is limited to three
sources: π0,z is the baseline country dummy, pppz determines the purchasing power in the
source country compared to Germany, ˆ wz/ˆ wTurk shifts the value of expected earnings in the
source countries according to expected wages in each country when the baseline country is
taken as Turkey.
The following is an explanation of the individual terms in the above equation.
1st line (Country Dummy): This is a discounted sum of per period country dummy
which is a measure of the general attractiveness of the source country compared to Germany.
It would depend on source country characteristics like per capita income level, whether
the country has a socialist regime, income inequality, political stability and so forth. This
dummy also includes the transportation cost of return, which would vary by country of
origin according to its distance from Germany. In addition, it accounts for the institutional
diﬀerence between the EU and non-EU countries in that non-EU immigrants can not engage
in repeat migration to Germany after they make a permanent return to their home countries.
2nd line (Value of Accumulated Assets): The value of accumulated wealth varies
according to wealth intereacted with ppp in an inverse exponential form. Both parameters
of the inverse exponential function varies with the age of the migrant because in his home
country a migrant’s per period consumption of the wealth he acquired in Germany would
depend on the remaining length of his life.
3rd line (Value of Potential Earnings at Home): The present discounted value of
immigrants’ utility from their earnings in their home country after return would depend on
their age at return as well as the country they return. Both the constant term and the slope





, which is the ratio of the
average earnings level in country z to that in Turkey.
4th line (Value of German Pension Beneﬁts): In order to qualify for German
pension beneﬁts, one must have worked for at least 5 years (which is 3 periods in our
model). ∆2




accounts for the diﬀerent purchasing power of German pension beneﬁts in diﬀerent
59source countries. (Turkey is taken as the baseline country.) Pension beneﬁts depend on
immigrants’ duration of residence in an inverse exponential functional form. (Periods of
unemployment are counted toward the contribution period. Since in the model, immigrants
are always in the labor market, duration of time in the labor market is equal to duration of
residence.)
B DETAILS OF THE ESTIMATION METHOD
The classiﬁcation error parameters and parameters that characterize the distribution of mea-
surement errors are estimated along with the other parameters of the model.
B.1 Classiﬁcation Errors
B.1.1 Unbiased Classiﬁc a t i o nE r r o ri nt h eL a b o rM a r k e tO u t c o m e s :
Classiﬁcation errors are unbiased when the probability of a particular outcome is the same
in the simulations and in the data.
Let l∗
it denote the observed labor market outcome in the data and lit denote the true
value from the simulations. Following Keane and Wolpin’s (2001) methodology, I write the










it =1 |lit 6=1 )=( 1− e E)b P(lit =1 ) ) (3)
where






and e E is a parameter measuring the extent of classiﬁcation error, which is transformed in
the following way in estimation.
e E =1 /[1 + exp(E)]
E is estimated along with the other parameters of the model Unbiasedness of the clas-
siﬁcation errors requires that when equations (2 and 3) are substituted into the equation
below, P(l∗





it = i|lit = i)P(lit = i)+P(l
∗
it = i|lit 6= i)P(lit 6= i)
60B.1.2 Biased Classiﬁc a t i o nE r r o ri nR e t u r nM i g r a t i o n
The classiﬁcation error in return migration has two important properties. First, a classi-
ﬁcation error is possible only when the reported choice is to leave because the fact that a
migrant was interviewed does not leave any doubt that he was in fact in Germany. This
implies that a classiﬁcation error can exist only in the last period in the sample. Second, the
fact that there may be a classiﬁcation error only if the observed choice is to leave implies
that the classiﬁcation error is biased. Thus, P(m∗
t =1 )6= P(mt =1 ) .















t =0 |mt =1 )=0
B.2 Measurement Errors
The measurement error distributions of earnings and savings are independent and serially
uncorrelated. They are speciﬁed in the following way.












B.2.2 Measurement Error in Savings
(At+1 − At)








σs,m = σs,m,0 + σs,m,1(At+1 − At)
B.3 Calculation of the Probabilities of Reported Spells Condi-
tional on the Simulated Spells
B.3.1 Calculation of P(Mobs
i |Msim
in )
The calculation of the probability of observing the registered spell conditional on the true
spell can be categorized into four groups according to which spell ends earlier and whether
o rn o ti te n d sw i t ha ne x i ta sf o l l o w s :
61Case 1: The simulated spell ends earlier with an exit.
D a t a 0000X
S i m u l a t e d0001
This has zero probability because since a return took place, this person could not have






Case 2: The data and simulated spell both end with an exit at the same period.
D a t a 00001
S i m u l a t e d00001










Note that the probability of correct of reporting of an exit, θ
m
1,1 =1 .
Case 3: The data spell ends earlier with an exit.
D a t a 00001. . .
S i m u l a t e d00000000














D a t a 00001. . .
S i m u l a t e d00000001
There are T1 periods of correct reporting of staying in Germany and T − T1 − 1 periods












Case 4: The data spell ends earlier without an exit.
D a t a 00000. .
S i m u l a t e d000000X










B.3.2 Calculation of P(lobs
i |lsim
in )
Unlike the above case, a classiﬁcation error in the reported labor market status can exist at
any period. Therefore, the probability of observing the reported labor market status spell


























int 6=1 )=1− θ
l
1,0
B.3.3 Calculation of P((At+1 − At)obs
i |(At+1 − At)sim
in )
The savings data in the GSOEP are censored at zero because the savings question is asked
only for positive savings. (Since I aggregate the data into two year periods, there are censor-
ing values other than zero as well.) For censored observations, the probability that At+1−At
equals the censoring value is written:
P((At+1 − At)
obs

























where φ is the standard normal density.



















63CS U B S I S T E N C E I N C O M E
In this section, I explain how subsistence income is calculated using demographic features of
immigrants and the German institutional rules. I calculate the probability of being married
by age and the mean number of children by age for each nationality. Then, I smooth both the
probability of being married and mean number of children proﬁles using lowess smoothing
and use these smoothed values in the following subsistence level income formula:
520 ∗ [1 + 0.8(prob_married)+0 .7(no_children)]31
The results are displayed in the below table.
TABLE C.1: SUBSISTENCE INCOME BY AGE AND ORIGIN
Age Turkish Yugoslavian Greek Italian Spanish
18 14,080        14,465        12,480        12,851        13,298       
20 16,747        15,734        13,430        14,429        14,823       
22 19,451        17,451        15,286        16,615        16,514       
24 22,091        19,267        17,229        18,906        18,211       
26 24,613        21,054        19,196        21,145        19,916       
28 26,988        22,801        21,100        23,216        21,554       
30 29,152        24,440        22,910        25,071        23,071       
32 30,970        25,866        24,571        26,668        24,429       
34 32,346        27,023        26,034        27,928        25,596       
36 33,247        27,863        27,213        28,775        26,519       
38 33,679        28,320        28,029        29,176        27,147       
40 33,667        28,380        28,452        29,128        27,428       
42 33,220        28,076        28,504        28,678        27,344       
44 32,434        27,451        28,226        27,919        26,968       
46 31,450        26,592        27,663        26,964        26,382       
48 30,324        25,628        26,912        25,898        25,662       
50 29,122        24,703        26,109        24,797        24,895       
52 27,956        23,893        25,409        23,750        24,156       
54 26,915        23,155        24,918        22,842        23,494       
56 26,043        22,463        24,675        22,120        22,939       
58 25,309        21,832        24,644        21,598        22,545       
60 24,590        21,238        24,652        21,251        22,346       
62 23,862        20,625        24,577        21,043        22,266       
64 23,168        19,938        24,387        20,962        22,239       
66 22,478        19,135        24,101        21,002        22,232       
68 21,748        18,199        23,717        21,155        22,246       
70 17,053        23,224        21,414        22,300       
72 22,722        21,758        22,385       
74 22,464      22,159      22,451      
31Children, in fact, receive 50 to 90 percent of the baseline amount depending on their age. We average
this as 70 percent.
64D PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Marginal Utility Parameters
µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5 µ6 µ7 µ8 µ9 µ10
4.115 4.546 5.289 5.349 −0.0877 −0.1372 −0.323 −0.086 0.0126 0.0865
(0.189) (0.130) (0.371) (0.328) (0.0047) (0.0071) (0.879) (0.013) (0.0027) (0.0085) _____________________________________________
Psychic Cost Parameters
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ5 ρ6 ρ7 ρ8
5,671 4,157 3,250 6,989 −380.4 −12.05 −176.9 −351.9
(110.3) (112.8) (670.7) (59.13) (19.42) (3.648) (17.49) (21.27)
ρ9 ρ10 ρ11 ρ12 ρ13 ρ14 ρ15 ρ16
3.172 −0.177 −1.035 6.704 −46.06 634.9 −2.417 −0.1589
(1.373) (0.284) (6.009) (0.480) (36.60) (104.8) (1.1343) (0.0396) _____________________________________________
Bequest Function Parameters









11.378 10.369 11.011 9.252 −0.00425 −0.0292 −0.00207 −0.00158
(0.1138) (0.0717) (0.2259) (15.069) (0.000429) (0.0456) (0.000184) (0.3955) _____________________________________________
V a l u eH o m eP a r a m e t e r s
π01 π02 π03 π04 π05 π11 π12 πc
13 πd
14
−1,861 −2,377 916.65 8 7 .66 0 8 .49 .420 8.049 −0.0114 0.0381




22 π23 π24 π25 π
f
31 π32 π33 π34
−1.067 −0.0145 16,586 −248.0 −8.765 0.0283 614.86 .356 −0.1087
(0.6168) (41.95) (1,137) (130.6) (4.276) (0.1598) (89.92) (0.817) (0.0223) _____________________________________________
Type Probability Function
κ1 κ2 κ3 κ4 κ5 κ6 κ7 κ8 κ9
3.097 0.00313 0.0541 −0.9073 −1.235 −4.921 −2.138 −0.0497 0.0433
(0.651) (0.0519) (0.0711) (0.7089) (0.9981) (1.077) (1.057) (0.1064) (0.1258)
κ10 κ11 κ12 κ13 κ14 κ15 κ16 κ17 κ18
2.061 0.0284 0.0606 −0.1134 −2.049 −2.647 −3.852 −0.00015 −0.00133
(0.774) (0.0537) (0.0771) (0.7310) (1.346) (1.272) (1.976) (0.1140) (0.1502)
65κ19 κ20 κ21 κ22 κ23 κ24 κ25 κ26 κ27
0.6315 −0.0031 −0.0400 −0.0319 2.141 1.924 1.977 −0.0033 −0.00012
(1.242) (0.0726) (0.0861) (0.8882) (1.327) (1.336) (1.365) (0.1734) (0.1862) _____________________________________________
Labor Market Transition After Age 60
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8
18.024 −0.0530 −43.010 −0.2156 −5.3138 −0.1460 −0.2913 0.1899
(0.413) (0.0072) (30.491) (0.0069) (0.6059) (0.0159) (0.2571) (0.0066) _____________________________________________
Employment Transition
α1 α2 α3 αb
4 α5 α6
−1.1635 4.6915 0.1535 −0.4025 0.0215 0.0472
(0.0321) (0.0591) (0.0012) (0.00058) (0.0277) (0.0013)
α7 α8 α9 α10 α11 α12 α13
0.3308 1.6521 2.1306 2.0876 −0.0784 0.2432 −1.3867





3 υ4 υ5 υ6 υ7 υ8 υ9 υ10
0.086 −0.0013 −0.1022 0.0366 0.175 0.160 0.227 −0.253 −0.0176 −0.904
(0.010) (0.0011) (0.0043) (0.0057) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.015) (0.0022) (0.023) _____________________________________________
Classiﬁcation and Measurement Errors
EFG σ y,m σs,m,0 σs,m,1
−9.6717 −0.1115 −2.8648 0.5661 9,551 0.0805
(5.5092) (680.9) (0.1805) (0.0068) (351.3) (0.0178) _____________________________________________
Other Parameters
δr λ p e
0.98068 0.01634 0.6339 11.633






NOTES: a - Parameter multiplied by 10.
b - Parameter multiplied by 100.
c - Parameter multiplied by 1000.
d - Parameter multiplied by 100,000.
e - Parameter in the model is deﬁned as exponential transformation of this.
f - Parameter in the model is deﬁn e da sl o g i s t i ct r a n f o r m a t i o no ft h i s .
66E MODEL FIT OF EXOGENOUS TRANSITIONS

























































































TABLE E.1: PERCENT RETIRED FOR ALL IMMIGRANTS
A g e 6 06 26 46 66 8
Actual 0.374 0.517 0.637 0.918 0.947
Predicted 0.411 0.681 0.849 0.938 0.983
67